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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
T h i s c o u r t has j u r i s d i c t i o n under Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 - 2 -
2 ( 3 ) ( j ) . P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d t h e i r N o t i c e of Cross-Appeal on 
Sep tember 14, 1990. (R. 1300 . ) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Are the t r i a l c o u r t ' s findings of fact supported by 
subs tan t i a l evidence? The standard for review i s tha t findings 
cannot be overturned unless c lea r ly erroneous. Cornish Town v. 
Koller , 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988). Contrary to Manivest 's 
content ion , ' in an equity case an appel la te court i s not a t 
" l i b e r t y to undertake an independent r e t r i a l of the factual 
i s s u e s . " Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 330, 340 (Utah 1980). 
M[T]he appel la te court defers to the 'advantaged pos i t ion of the 
t r i a l judge who sees and hears the w i t n e s s e s . ' " Parks 
Enterpr ises v. New Century Realty, 652 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1982) 
(quoting McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978)). The 
findings of the t r i a l court wil l not be upset unless the evidence 
so c l ea r ly preponderates against them tha t the appe l la te court i s 
convinced tha t manifest in jus t i ce has been done. Horton v. 
Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1984). This ru le appl ies "even 
where the level of the proof in the t r i a l court i s c lea r and 
convincing evidence." I<3.3 The described standard appl ies in 
Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985) was not an equ i ty 
case and did not suggest a de novo s t anda rd . The cour t app l ied an abuse of 
d i s c r e t i o n s t anda rd . 
New Mercur Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining Co. , 128 P.2d 269 
(Utah 1942) was a qu ie t t i t l e ac t ion involving mining c l a i m s . Utah c o u r t s 
have enforced the f o r f e i t u r e of l e a s e s on numerous occas ions without s t a t i n g 
t h a t t he s tandard of proof a t t r i a l must be c l e a r and convincing ev idence . In 
a l l equity cases including those involving fo r fe i tu re of leases . 
Ute-Cal Land Development v. Intermountain Stock Exchange, 628 
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981) .4 
2. Did the t r ia l court abuse i t s discretion by finding 
that certain defaults were within the scope of the pleadings? 
The standard for review i s that the t r i a l court's decision to 
allow evidence of defaul ts which the court found to be within the 
scope of the pleadings, may only be se t aside if i t was an abuse 
of d i s c r e t i o n . This i s not an evident iary question; rather, i t 
deals with the way in which the court in te rpre ted the Mscope of 
the p leadings ." The t r i a l cour t ' s decision to allow amendment of 
pleadings with respect to evidence presented i s "within the sound 
d i sc re t ion of the t r i a l judge." F i r s t OK Corporation v. Cur t i s , 
550 P.2d 157 (Utah 1976) . 
3. Did Manivest v io la t e the Lease by making assignments? 
4. Did Manivest fs loan t ransact ions v io l a t e the Lease? 
5. Did Manivest assign the Lease for the benefi t of 
c red i to r s? 
6. Were the encroachments encumbrances? 
any event, in this case, before ordering a forfeiture, the t r ia l court 
expressly stated that it had considered all of the facts and circumstances 
according to the applicable standard of proof. 
In Jones v. Thorvaldson, 392 P.2d 43 (Utah 1964), the t r ia l court 
terminated a 20-year lease because the tenant failed to operate in a business-
like and workmanlike manner. The Utah Supreme Court defined the standard of 
review as follows: n0n appeal, we survey the evidence, and any reasonable 
inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the contentions of the 
[ appellees ] in accordance with the tr ial court's findings. I_d* a t ^4 
(Emphas is a d d e d ) . 
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7. Taking in to account a l l of the various defaults and a l l 
of the facts and circumstances, was forfeiture of the Lease 
appropriate? 
8. Are the Howes, as the non-defaulting party, ent i t led to 
recover t h e i r cos t s , expenses, and attorneys' fees? 
9. Was Manivest obligated to maintain the improvements 
under the Lease? 
Issues 3, 4, 6 and 9 involve questions of law, which are 
subject to review for correctness without any specia l deference 
to the t r i a l cour t . Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 
1989). However, they also involve fact determinat ions. Manivest 
has d i s to r t ed the standard of review for these issues by attempt-
ing to construct narrow legal questions of contract i n t e r p r e t a -
t ion based upon i t s own f ic t iona l ized version of the f ac t s . For 
example, Manivest fs so cal led questions of law assume tha t there 
was "reasonable" weed cont ro l , tha t the Howes " a r b i t r a r i l y 
withheld consent in order to renegot ia te the r e n t a l , " tha t the 
assignments of the Lease and subleases were "merely" as secu r i ty , 
and tha t the assignments only involved par tnerships with the same 
Manivest t akes extreme l i c e n s e with the f a c t s s e v e r a l t imes in i t s 
b r i e f . There i s no evidence whatsoever t h a t t h e va lue of Man ives t ' s i n t e r e s t s 
should inc lude not only t he $500,000 t o $600,000 cash flow va lue found by t h e 
cour t bu t , in a d d i t i o n t he claimed $2,000,000 worth of improvements. 
Man ives t ' s w i tnesses a t t r i a l agreed t h a t t h e cash flow v a l u a t i o n was t h e 
a p p r o p r i a t e method. I t s dep rec i a t ed improvements were worth no more t o 
Manivest than the income they could produce, reduced by t h e s u b s t a n t i a l 
a d d i t i o n a l expenses necessary in order t o p roper ly mainta in t hose 
improvements. (Tr. 360, 1. 23-25.) S i g n i f i c a n t l y Manivest p re sen ted no 
evidence of amounts i nves t ed . The assignments a l ready i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e 
claimed $2,000,000 number has no r e l a t i o n s h i p t o inves tment . Manivest seeks 
t o cloud the i s s u e s s ince i t does not at tempt t o over tu rn t he t r i a l cour t 
f inding as t o va lue . (O.B. p . 36.) 
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general partner. These assumptions are all contradicted by the 
facts and by the court's findings.6 They cannot, therefore, be 
relied upon to state a "narrow question of law." 
Issue Number 5 is an issue of fact and may not be reversed 
unless clearly erroneous. Cornish Town, supra. 
Issue Number 7 is subject to rules of equity. Manivest 
mistakenly suggests that the trial court's decision to enforce a 
forfeiture is subject to de novo review. That decision, however, 
is an equitable judgment, which this court has repeatedly said 
should be set aside only where necessary to present manifest 
injustice. Jackson v. Jackson, supra. The trial court's dispo-
sition is entitled to deference. 
Issue Number 8 is subject to review under the abuse of 
discretion standard as to the amount of reasonable attorneys' 
fees, since the evidence on fees is uncontroverted. As to other 
issues, the standard would be that for questions of law. 
6 
Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts, Inc., 
596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979). There, the court reviewed a "narrow" legal 
question on appeal from a summary judgment. The court stated that when the 
issue is "solely" one of law, the appellate court may undertake de novo 
review. 
7 
Since all of the trial court's findings are supported by 
substantial, credible evidence, the only questions of law are these: 
1. Was the prohibition against assignments merely a disabling 
restraint? 
2. Is an encroachment an encumbrance? 
3. Were any of the various encumbrances a burden or limitation on any 
of the Howes' rights or interests? 
4. Did the Lease prohibit Manivest from encumbering its leasehold 
estate without the Howes' knowledge and consent? 
-4-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is about a ground lease (the "Lease") signed in 
1960 under which appellees (the "Howes") leased a portion of 
their family dairy farm for development as a shopping center. 
The Lease provided that the Howes would allow their property to 
serve as security for development loans, which they did. The 
Lease did not permit any other encumbrances, by either the Howes 
or the tenant. Eventually, Professional Manivest, Inc. 
("Manivest"), succeeded to the tenant's interest under the Lease. 
In 1988, Manivest asked the Howes to consent to a $4,000,000 
loan. The Howes investigated the request and learned that 
Manivest was in default under the Lease. After Manivest repeat-
edly ignored the Howes' demands to cure the defaults, the Howes 
terminated the Lease. Manivest continued to ignore the defaults 
for months and threatened to sue the Howes; therefore, the Howes 
commenced this litigation. Manivest counterclaimed and asserted 
the Howes had breached a duty of fair dealing and were required 
by law to consent to the $4,000,000 loan. Manivest even claimed 
punitive damages. (R. 80-83.) 
During discovery, by reviewing Manivestfs files, the Howes 
learned for the first time of additional defaults. They notified 
Manivest that they intended to use documents from Manivestfs 
files as evidence at trial. (R. 356.) Despite being diligent, 
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the Howes only received access to the property and to certain 
vital documents shortly before trial. 
At trial, the court ruled Manivest did not have a duty under 
the Lease to maintain the improvements. It is this issue that 
forms the basis of the cross appeal. After a two day trial, the 
court, sitting as a court of equity, received written briefs in 
lieu of closing arguments. Later, the court ruled in favor of 
the Howes. The court determined that Manivest1s defaults were 
willful, persistent and material and that forfeiture of the Lease 
was appropriate. 
Manivest did not post a supersedeas bond, and its motion for 
a stay without bond pending appeal was denied. On August 31, 
1990, the Howes took possession of the shopping center. Manivest 
then filed a motion for stay with this court. On September 6, 
1990, after receiving briefs and hearing arguments, this court 
denied Manivest's motion for a stay. Since that date, the Howes 
have been in possession of the shopping center.8 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Background. 
The parties to the Lease were represented by counsel. The 
tenants' attorney, James P. ("Phil") Cowley, arranged to have the 
The Howes represented that they did not intend to transfer the 
Property or raze any of the buildings without further order of the court, and 
the Utah Supreme Court so ordered. 
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Lease recorded. (Ex. 1.) He also notarized his clients' signa-
tures when they assigned the Lease to a corporation. (Ex. 5.) 
The Howes proffered Mr. Cowley as a witness at trial to testify 
9 
as to the intention of the parties. (Tr. 186.) 
In accordance with the terms of the Lease, a small shopping 
center was constructed in the 1960*s on the Howes' property. The 
Howes subordinated to the necessary construction financing as 
required by the Lease. Except for construction of the shopping 
center, the Lease prohibited both the Howes and the tenant from 
creating any other encumbrances. Notwithstanding, the Howes were 
asked in 1971 to consent to an $852,000 loan. (Ex. 4; Tr. 26, 1. 
22-27, 1. 7.) The Howes rejected the request and no loan was 
obtained. (Tr. 27, 1. 19-22.) Also in 1971, the tenant sought 
the Howes' consent to assign the Lease to National Realty, Ltd., 
a limited partnership in which Manivest was the general partner. 
After investigating, the Howes gave their consent. (Ex. 5.) 
Later, without the Howes' knowledge or consent, Manivest 
obtained loans, assigned the Lease and created encumbrances at 
various times for purposes of benefitting Manivest. (Exs. 11, 
12, 13, 14, 17 & 18. ) 
There is no evidence as to who actually "drafted" the Lease. 
Moreover, the rule that contracts should be construed against the drafter does 
not operate unless the contract is found to be ambiguous, and, even the, only 
after other rules of construction have been applied and extrinsic evidence 
admtted. It is used only as a "last resort." Wilburn v. Interstate 
Electric, 748 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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In January of 1988, for the first time since 1971, Manivest 
asked the Howes to consent to a financing transaction. After 
obtaining a $4,000,000 loan, Manivest sent the Howes a letter 
along with what Manivest described as an "Acknowledgement." 
(Ex. 8.) The letter indicated Manivest had obtained a loan and 
assigned the Lease to Valley Bank. Manivest asked the Howes to 
execute the Acknowledgement and have their signatures notarized. 
Id,; (Finding 10.) 
The Acknowledgement sought to change terms of the Lease.1 
Moreover, it contained the following troublesome language: 
"The undersigned [the Howes] acknowledges that the 
Lessee is encumbering their interest in the property 
and said loan is hereby approved as required by said 
lease." (Ex. 8.) (Emphasis added) 
After examining loan documents and hearing considerable testi-
mony, the trial court made this pivotal finding: 
10. . . . Intentionally, or otherwise, the acknowl-
edgement submitted to the plaintiffs included language 
intended to cause the plaintiffs' interest to be 
subordinated to the 1987-88 Valley Bank loan. Exhibits 
"8", "17", "18" and "19." The action of the defendants 
in making this request in the form proposed constituted 
something less than good faith and fair dealing. 
When the Howes received the Acknowledgement, they knew 
nothing of Manivest's prior multiple assignments and 
It would have (1) allowed the bank 15 days notice of default, (2) 
prohibited amendments without notice to the bank, (3) waived any and all 
existing defaults by Manivest, (4) released the bank from any "present 
obligation" and (5) given the bank the "right" but not the obligation to cure. 
E> . 8. 
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encumbrances. The Howes subsequent investigation revealed a 
disconcerting pattern of concealment. They learned that Manivest 
already had recorded both a Trust Deed and an Assignment of the 
Lease, and that Manivest had assigned all of the subleases for 
the shopping center tenants. (Ex. 17, 18; Findings 8, 9.) The 
Howes also discovered that Manivest had previously, at different 
times, borrowed $1,000,000 from First Security Bank and $488,000 
from Valley Bank,1" in each case recording encumbrances and 
assigning all subleases. (Findings 6, 7; Ex. 11, 12, 13 & 14.) 
In addition, inspection of the exterior of the shopping center 
revealed parts of it littered with trash and weeds. (Tr. 85, 1. 
2-6; Ex. 28. ) 
Facts Relating to Notice and Opportunity to Cure. 
The Howes then gave Manivest written notice of default by 
certified mail even though the Lease did not require such notice. 
(Ex. 30; Finding 11.) Despite timely receipt of this notice, 
Manivest took no action whatsoever to remedy the defaults. After 
receiving no response, the Howes sent another certified letter. 
(Ex. 30.) Manivest received this notice and again did nothing to 
remedy the defaults. After another month went by with no 
apparent attempt having been made to cure, the Howes served a 
In 1986, Manivest gave a lien waiver to a bank which had made a 
loan to one of the subtenants at the shopping center. In it, Manivest 
warranted that it was the "sole owner" of the shopping center site and that 
this location was "encumbered by" the Trust Deed for the 1982 $488,000 loan. 
Manivest thereby acknowledged that the $488,000 loan was an "encumbrance" on 
the property. Ex. 15. 
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n o t i c e of t e r m i n a t i o n . Manivest r ece ived t h i s n o t i c e on June 1, 
1988, but Manivest cont inued t o ignore the d e f a u l t s and t h e 
n o t i c e of t e r m i n a t i o n . (Findings 14, 15; Ex. 31 . ) 
In August of 1988, t he Howes demanded t h a t Manivest s u r r e n -
der p o s s e s s i o n . Manivest r e fused . F i n a l l y , in l a t e September 
1988, Manivest removed c e r t a i n of t he encumbrances but not t he 
assignment of t he sub leases t o Val ley Bank.12 Manivest claimed 
t h a t by r e l i n q u i s h i n g t h i s c o l l a t e r a l i t s $4,000,000 loan was in 
d e f a u l t and t h a t t he Howes' were a c t i n g in bad f a i t h . (Ex. 32. ) 
F i n a l l y , Manivest t h r e a t e n e d to sue the Howes. 2^- Faced wi th 
t h i s t h r e a t , t he Howes f i l e d t h e i r Complaint for f o r f e i t u r e . (R. 
2 . ) 
Add i t iona l Fac ts Re la t ing t o the Acknowledgement. 
The Court found t h a t the Acknowledgement inc luded language 
in tended t o cause the Howes' i n t e r e s t t o be subord ina ted t o 
Val ley Bank. (Finding 10.) Val ley Bank did not propose t h e 
s u b o r d i n a t i o n language , and no one from Val ley Bank or i t s law 
firm authored i t . Larry Leeper mailed the " r e v i s e d " Acknowledge-
ment t o the Howes. (Ex. 8.) The Acknowledgement t h a t he s en t 
inc luded s u b o r d i n a t i o n language; the ve r s ion of t h a t document in 
the bank ' s f i l e s did n o t . (Tr. 66, 1. 11-14; 67, 1. 1-12.) The 
The Assignment of the sub leases purpor ted t o g ive the bank t h e 
r i g h t t o t ake possess ion of the p rope r ty , manage i t , execute new l e a s e s , 
cancel old l e a s e s and c o l l e c t and apply any of t h e r e n t s and p r o f i t s t o 
Man ives t ' s o b l i g a t i o n s t o the bank. (Ex. 17.) All t h e bank in tended t o do 
was t o r e l e a s e "any recorded1 ' assignment of t he l e s s e e ' s i n t e r e s t in t h e 
ground l e a s e . " (Tr. 156, 1. 2 -7 . ) (Emphasis added.) Manivest and Val ley 
Bank wanted the pub l i c record t o "look good." 
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language first appeared in handwritten form in Exhibit 19, also a 
document from Manivest's records. (Tr. 67-68.) Mr. Baldwin, the 
bank's counsel, prepared the Acknowledgement in both its original 
and its revised form, but did not recommend the troublesome 
language (Tr. 143, 1. 23) or write it (Tr. 158, 1. 22 to 160, 
19). He explained: "Mr. Cameron [the loan officer] subsequently 
returned [a draft of the Acknowledgement] to me and apparently it 
had some additional language that was requested to be inserted, 
by whom I don't know, and I inserted it." (Tr. 158, 1. 18-21.) 
Before the trial, Mr. Baldwin asked "each of the Bank officers 
whether the handwriting on Exhibit 19 was their handwriting." At 
trial he reported that he was "unable to determine that it is the 
handwriting of any loan officer of Valley Bank." (Tr. 160, 1. 
11-16. ) 
The source of the handwriting was approached time and again 
from various angles. It gave the court the opportunity to 
carefully consider the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses. 
Bank representatives categorically denied responsibility for the 
language, and Manivest did not offer any explanation as to who 
authorized the language or why the handwritten change was found 
in its file and not in the bank's file. The court had to form 
its own conclusions. 
When Mr. Baldwin was asked to explain the meaning of the 
subordination language to the court, he acknowledged that the 
word "undersigned" was plural and referred to "the Howe interests 
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in the property." (Tr. 158, 1. 1-3.) Larry Leeper agreed that 
"lessee" was singular. (Tr. 293, L. 6-22.) 
Additional Facts Relating to the $4,000,000 Encumbrance. 
The Acknowledgement, as mailed to the Howes, was consistent 
with other loan documents for the $4,000,000 loan. Both the Loan 
Agreement and the Trust Deed suggest that the loan was meant to 
encumber the Howes' interest in the property. (Ex. 16, 17.) The 
Loan Agreement called for a trust deed on the "real property" and 
used the actual legal description of the real property, without 
suggesting in any way that it was limited to Manivestfs interest 
therein. (Ex. 16.) Moreover, the Loan Agreement required that 
the loan be "subject only to a first deed of trust in favor of 
Zions First National Bank." Jki. (Emphasis added). The Zions 
Bank loan was an original construction loan to which the Howes 
had subordinated their interest. (Ex. 3.) Thus, these loan 
documents were drafted so as to encumber the fee. Mr. Leeper 
admitted that the language of the Loan Agreement "purports to 
encumber the real property." (Tr. 291, 1. 1-4.) 
When asked why the bank released some of the encumbrances 
but not all, Mr. Baldwin testified that the bank "had what we 
wanted, which was the underlying tenant leases." (Tr. 156, 1. 
12-16.) He further explained: "In the event of default on the 
loan, we wanted to be in a position to notify those tenants to 
make payments directly to (the bank) to apply to the loan." (Tr. 
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140, 1. 25 to 141, 1. 3.) Mr. Baldwin pointedly denied that the 
Howes could still claim the subtenant rents: 
I am not saying the assignment of the shopping center 
leases was not valid without that Acknowledgement, 
because that's a separate leg of the transaction. 
Those are leases between Manivest and its own shopping 
center tenants. We got those." (Tr. 150, 1. 15-19.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
After the bank released the trust deed, Manivest's attorney 
claimed that the loan was in jeopardy (Ex. 32), but Mr. Baldwin 
testified that the bank had "not declared a default, but had 
merely "asked for additional or substitute collateral." (Tr. 
162, 18-21.) 
Additional Facts Relating to the Fai lure to Control Weeds. 
Manivest must acknowledge tha t when the Howes f i r s t gave 
not ice of default and for a period of several months the rea f t e r 
the property was not in compliance with the terms of the Lease. 
(Ex. 28.'4) Despite repeated demands and even the termination of 
the Lease, Manivest took no action to correct the condition u n t i l 
l a t e in the summer. (Ex. 32.) By then, the weeds had become a 
f i r e hazard. (Exs. 28, 32; Finding 16.) After reviewing 
photographs taken over the period of five months, the Murray City 
Had Valley Bank pressed that i s sue , the Howes cer ta in ly would have 
opposed i t . But at t r i a l and in i t s motion to intervene, Valley Bank's 
purpose was c l e a r . 
The Exhibit 28 photographs were taken in March of 1988, before the 
Howes sent the not ice of defaul t ; in May of 1988, before they sent the 
termination not i ce ; in June of 1988, after the termination no t i ce ; and again 
in July of 1988. Tr. 85, 1. 2-16. The t r i a l court l imited testimony about 
the photographs. In a c l a s s i c understatement, the t r i a l court found the 
photographs "rather c lear with regard to what they dep ic t ." Tr. 88, 1. 10-
12. 
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inspector testified that the weeds on the Property consistently 
violated the ordinance. (Tr. 376-379.) This was not the first 
time this had occurred. Surprisingly, the problem reoccurred 
during the litigation. In July of 1989, Murray City again issued 
a notice of violation. (Ex. 34. )15 After considering the 
notices, the photographs, and the testimony from witnesses 
including the Murray City inspector, the court found that 
"improper conditions on the Property continued after • . . 
notices from Murray City, or were allowed to reoccur on multiple 
occasions,16 including after [the Howes] served notice of intent 
to terminate the Lease." (Ex. 23, 26, 28, 34; Findings 21, 22.) 
Manivest did not refute this evidence. Its defense seems to 
have been that it met a "standard of control" because it had in 
place a "regular maintenance program." The evidence shows that 
neither the Howes, the City or the Court accepted this. 
Facts Relating to Assignments to MP Investments, Westco, and 
Diversi fied. 
Manivest now seems to concede that these transfers were 
"assignments of the lease," but claims that they were not 
Finding 21 should refer to Exhibit "34." R. 701. 4/17/90. 
16 
A Notice of Violation issued by Murray City on April 21, 1983 
included a photocopy of the Murray City Code identifying the various viola-
tions, including "garbage, ashes, market waste, trade waste, manure, night 
soil or other refuse," as well as "junk, scrap metal, scrap lumber, waste 
paper products, discarded building materials, or any unused abandoned vehicle, 
vehicles or abandoned parts, machinery or machinery parts." Ex. 23. Exhibit 
25 included photographs taken in March or February of 1985 and showing weeds, 
piles of dirt and rubbish. Tr. 81, 1. 4 to 82, 1. 22. Exhibit 27 included 
photographs taken during the summer of 1985, and showed that conditions were 
"worse because the weeds had continued to grow." Tr. 83, 1. 12 to 84, 1. 7. 
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prohibited because they were "between limited partnerships having 
the same general partner." O.B. p. 1. Manivest admits, however, 
that Westco is not a limited partnership but a separate corpora-
tion, and cites no evidence that it was a subsidiary of Manivest. 
Further Manivest cites no evidence that it, rather than these 
entities, had control. Manivest's witnesses testified at trial 
that it made these transfers in order to obtain a stepped up 
basis for tax purposes, (Tr. 321, 1. 17-19) and increased cash 
flow. 
Facts Showing that Manivest was on Notice of Defaults and 
not Surprised at Trial. 
Before filing the Complaint, the Howes had no access to any 
records pertaining to encumbrances and assignments. Therefore, 
during discovery, the Howes' attorneys spent days combing through 
30 years of records at Manivest's offices. (R. 356.) 
Exhibit 10 (Quitclaim Deed and other evidence of encroach-
ments) was obtained from Manivestfs files and was on the Howe's 
exhibit list provided to Manivest one month before trial. (R. 
386.) The court excluded all of Exhibit 10 except for the 
Quitclaim Deed, which related to the encroachments. The 
Quitclaim Deed, however came in without objection except as to 
relevance.17 
Manivest's counsel said: "I am not going to stand in [the] way of 
putting in documents that I acknowledge have been signed by Manivest people. 
To that extent I will consent to the admission of the quit-claim deed if that 
is beneficial. I think that's fair and I think that that could come in as 
non-hearsay, so out of fairness I'll let him have it." Tr. p. 44, 1. 2-8. 
-15-
Exhibit 22 included sales agreements from National Realty to 
MD Investments Limited dated February 1, 1976; from MD 
Investments Limited to Westco Realty, Inc. dated January 1, 1978; 
and from Westco Realty, Inc. to Diversified Realty Limited dated 
January 1, 1978. All of this information was obtained from 
Manivest's files and was on the Howes' exhibit list provided to 
Manivest one month before trial. (R. 386.) 
Shortly before trial, Manivest's attorneys finally gave the 
Howes a copy of a document entitled "Manivest Liquidating Trust 
and Workout Plan" showing additional defaults. (Ex. 21 and Ex. 
40; Tr. 97 1. 5-8.) Manivest listed this document in its 
Designation of Witnesses and Exhibits dated February 6, 1990 as 
Item 21. (R. 391.) The Howes received it from Manivest just a 
few days before the trial and promptly listed it on their 
Designation of Supplemental Exhibits dated March 3, 1990. (R. 
804.) It was admitted by stipulation. (Tr. 222.) 
A general maintenance obligation was alleged in the 
Complaint. Moreover, several months before the trial, the Howes 
again advised Manivest that their complaints dealt not only with 
weeds but "other maintenance issues". (R. 210, at f 6. ) 
Thereafter, the Howes attempted on several occasions to make 
arrangements with Manivest to conduct a complete inspection of 
the shopping center improvements. (R. 356, flfl 18-20.) Their 
efforts were rebuffed until finally they served Manivest with a 
Rule 34 Motion to Permit Access to Property. (R. 250.) Much of 
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the evidence of health, safety and other code or statutory 
violations came as a result of this inspection. 
Manivest listed the owner of the business having the illegal 
underground storage tanks as one of its witnesses (R. 408), as 
did the Howes (R. 802). Mr. Leonard's deposition was taken by 
Manivest on February 22, 1990, and Manivest's counsel 
acknowledged the existence of "abandoned fuel filling tanks." 
(R. 400; Appendix A, p. 14.) Manivest's counsel also asked Mr. 
Leonard about certain of the health and safety violations at Mr. 
Leonard's deposition (Appendix id. 24-28).18 
Facts Relating to the Assignment to the Liquidating Trust. 
Another assignment occurred even after Manivest received the 
Howes' notice of default. The court found: 
20. On or about April 28, 1988, without plaintiffs' 
knowledge or consent, defendants assigned their 
interest in the Lease to a liquidating trust. Exhibits 
"21" and "40." The Liquidating Trust was expressly 
established to liquidate all assets, including the 
Southlake Shopping Center situated on the Property, for 
the benefit of creditors. 
This was a finding, not a conclusion on a narrow question of law. 
For example, Mr. Mortenson, one of the trustees, testified that 
the Liquidating Trust joined in signing any important documents 
pertaining to the shopping center. (Tr. 366, 1. 7-23.) 
18 
Indeed, even Manivest's List of Witnesses and Exhibits (R. 388) 
stated that it intended to use at trial "documents regarding the maintenance 
and appearance of the property generated within the last 10 years," a "Summary 
of expenses for maintenance of Southlake Shopping Center over the last few 
years," and "all correspondence sent to or from the plaintiffs or their agents 
since 1982 regarding maintenance or appearance of the property." (R. 388, 1 
22, 23, 25.) 
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Mr. Leeper said that his "involvement with the management of the 
Southlake Shopping Center is through the Liquidating Trust" (Tr. 
287, 1. 5-9) "not through the officers and directors of 
Manivest." I_d., 1. 10-12.19 The credit analysis report which 
Randy Cameron submitted to bank management on August 23, 1988 
stated that by then, the Trust had become the "new general 
partner of all limited partnerships"; furthermore, that "all 
business assets" of Professional Manivest, Inc. had been 
"transferred" to the Trust. (Ex. "20".) Mr. Mortenson was the 
source of this information. (Tr. 131, 1. 1-13.) 
Facts Relating to Violations of Law. 
The court found numerous health and safety violations at the 
shopping center. 
23. Defendants, directly or through their tenants, 
allowed health and safety violations to occur and 
continue on the Property through the present, 
including, but not limited to, electrical violations, 
disrepair of the parking lot, exposed mechanical 
equipment, sagging roof, improperly supported gas line, 
loose debris on the roof, broken windows, water 
accumulating by electrical lines and excess water 
accumulation, and exterior electrical outlets not 
waterproofed, as evidenced by the testimony of 
Architects Robert P. Leonard and Judge Hawks. Exhibit 
"39. " 
When asked at trial whether it was MtrueM that the Manivest group 
of companies resigned as general partner of "all partnerships/' Mr. Leeper 
said "yes." Tr. 302, 1. 18-24. He admitted that the Trust manages the center 
and that he reports to the Board of Trustees. Tr. 303, 1. 19 to 304, 1. 8. 
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The Howes' expert witness introduced photographs of and t e s t i f i e d 
regarding these problems.20 Although he did not have the code 
book a t t r i a l , Mr. Leonard had no problem s t a t i ng t h a t , based 
upon his professional knowledge, there were code v i o l a t i o n s . 
(Tr. 207.) 
Manivest*s only c r i t i c i sm of Mr. Leonard's testimony went to 
the weight to be attached to tha t evidence. But Mr. Leonard's 
testimony was uncontroverted; therefore , the weight to be 
attached i s c l ea r ly within the province of the t r i a l cour t . 
The court a lso found tha t underground storage tanks located 
on a port ion of the property which Manivest had subleased had not 
been reg i s te red as required by law. Finding 24. On behalf of 
the Howes, Mr. Evans invest igated the tanks and determined from 
the Utah Bureau of Solid and Hazardous Waste tha t they were not 
r eg i s t e r ed . (Tr. 212, 1. 19 to 213 1. 12.) Mr. Leeper t e s t i -
f ied: "I think I 've probably suspected a l l along tha t there were 
storage tanks t h e r e . " (Tr. 277, 1, 18-19.) He acknowledged tha t 
they were more than 25 years old (Tr. 321, 1. 2-8) , and admitted 
tha t he knew tha t under both federal and s t a t e law, the tanks 
were required to be r eg i s t e r ed . (Tr. 310, 1. 13-15.) 
Mr. Leonard was a l icensed archi tect who s ince 1978, has been the 
d i s t r i c t archi tec t for the Davis County School D i s t r i c t and i t s d irector of 
new construct ion. Tr. 165, 1. 18-24. He had practiced in the f i e l d of 
archi tecture and been associated with construction a c t i v i t i e s s ince 1957 and 
had extens ive experience in dealing with a l l types of construct ion . Tr. 166, 
1. 12-15. Mr. Leonard ident i f i ed the safety and code v i o l a t i o n s in photo-
graphs 16, 21, 29, 33, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51 of Exhibit 39. 
Tr. 207, 1. 4-6. He a l so t e s t i f i e d that he found various holes in the parking 
lot that were unsafe and that water running down the building into areas 
commonly used by patrons was an unsafe condit ion. Tr. 200, 1. 17-21. Tr. 
205, 1. 1-6. 
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Facts Relating to the Materiality of the Defaults. 
There was considerable evidence that the Howes had been 
harmed. a The underground storage tanks exposed the Howes to 
severe liabilities. Finding 24. So did the "numerous" health 
and safety violations. Finding 22-23. Because Manivest persis-
tently refused to cure the defaults, the Howes were required to 
file suit and incur substantial fees, costs and expenses. 
(R. 1149.) The encroachments exposed the Howes to claims by the 
adjacent property owner and the possible loss of property. (Ex. 
10.) The condition of the property was a source of concern to 
the Howes, whose family and friends resided nearby. The 
Assignment for the benefit of creditors further harmed the Howes. 
The statement by the trial court that the Howes would not 
have entered into the Lease if they had foreseen the defaults was 
another way of saying that the defaults were material. The trial 
court's language refers to the Lease violations as "material 
breaches," of Ma substantial nature," and of "primary 
importance." Finding. 25. Clearly, the Howes' demand letters 
demonstrated that they considered the defaults to be material. 
In their termination notice (Ex. 31), the Howes advised Manivest 
that they had not accepted and would not accept rent after becoming aware of 
the defaults. During the litigation, the Howes sought a stipulation which 
would have allowed them to receive compensation for Manivest*s continued use 
and occupation of the property without waiving their right to terminate the 
Lease. Manivest refused, and the trial court declined to enter an order 
permitting the Howes to negotiate the rent checks without waiving their 
rights. R. 149. Consequently, the Howes went without any income from the 
shopping center until they regained possession in September of 1990. Affi-
davit of Gerrit M. Steenblik. R. Supreme Court Record on Manivest Motion to 
Stay. 
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(Ex. 30, 31.) Moreover, all of the defaults persisted long after 
notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure, despite the fact 
that the Lease made time "of the essence." (Ex. 1, f 23.) 
Finally, if they were "no big deal" as Manivest contends, why 
didn't Manivest just take care of them? It had ample opportunity 
± J 23 
to do so. 
Facts Regarding the Counterclaim. 
When asked whether the Howes were required to sign the 
Acknowledgement, Mr. Baldwin testified point blank: "In my 
opinion, they did not." (Tr. 148, 1. 5-6.) Baldwin also 
A "time of the essence" provision gives a minor breach as to 
timely performance the legal effect of a material breach. See Corbin on 
Contracts § 718, Vol. 3, p. 797 (1963) (Supp. 1991); Zancanaro v. Cross, 339 
P.2d 746 (Ariz. 1959). 
Manivest authorities can be distinguished. Moon Lake Electrical 
Association v. Ultrasystems Western Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988), was a bonding case subject to the particular requirements of bid 
bonds. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078 (Utah 
1983) and Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952), involve the forfeiture 
of a purchaser's rights under installment real estate contract. Our courts 
have constructed very specific rules for these situations. Moreover, the 
Maxwel1 court denied forfeiture because there was confusion as to the time 
period within which the performance was required. The notice given to the 
delinquent buyer was indefinite or uncertain as to the performance demanded. 
Id. at 1081. The court held that the buyer was entitled to rely upon the 30-
day notice it received from the title company and tendered its performance 
well within that time period. Polyglycoat v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449 (Utah 
1979), arose out of an alleged violation of an exclusive marketing contract. 
There is nothing to suggest that the remedies were agreed to by the parties; 
therefore, under the U.C.C. and common law the court determined on what basis 
to allow "rescission." In Harar Realty Corp. v. Michlin & Hill, Inc., 449 
N.Y.S.2d 213 (N.Y. 1982), the lease required the owner's consent to 
improvements only if the cost exceeded $5,000. At trial, the court found that 
they cost only $3,500. Finally, unlike the tenant in Southern Hotel Company 
v. Miscott, 337 N.E.2d 660 (Ohio App. 1975), Manivest did not attempt to cure 
its default immediately upon receiving notice thereof, and there was no 
credible evidence that the Howes engaged in unfair dealing or attempted to 
take advantage of Manivest. Findings 29-30. In Southern Hotel there had been 
a long history of delinquencies until a new owner took over and attempted to 
"set up" the tenant by not giving fair notice of its intent to terminate. 
Moreover, the alleged default was immediately cured. 
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"advised the Bank that it was not legally required." (Tr. 148, 
1. 7-8, T. 150, 1. 6-7.) There was no contrary evidence. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court's findings of fact are supported by 
substantial evidence. Manivest does not contest many of the 
critical fact finding made by the trial court. Where it does 
contest the facts, it has the burden to show the finding is 
against the clear weight of the evidence. 
II. The Trial Court properly admitted evidence of 
Manivest1 s numerous defaults. Manivest was not surprised. 
Manivest cannot demonstrate a factual basis to justify its 
surprise. The pleadings gave notice. The Howes in their 
pretrial filing with the court also gave specific information. 
III. Manivest repeatedly assigned the lease in violation of 
Paragraph 4. It is a breach of the covenants of the Lease for 
Manivest to assign the Lease without the knowledge and consent of 
the Howes. None of the explanations offered by Manivest are 
consistent with the terms of the Lease or the facts found at 
trial. 
IV. Manivest1s loan transactions violated the covenant 
against encumbrances. A lessee may not encumber its interest in 
a lease without the approval of the lessor if the lease so 
provides. The interest of the Howes was affected by the improper 
encumbrances. Manivest concealed the encumbrances from the 
Howes. 
V. Manivest violated the lease by making an assignment for 
the benefit of creditors. All of the Manivest assets were 
assigned to the Liquidating Trust in violation of the Lease. 
Manivest has no credible evidence which it can cite to the 
contrary. 
VI. The Trial Court correctly determined that the encroach-
ments were unauthorized encumbrances. Manivest permitted an 
encroachment to develop which affected the property rights of the 
Howes. 
VII. The judgment of forfeiture is appropriate and should be 
affirmed. Forefeiture is mandatory when in a case in equity the 
evidence of improper conduct is clear and there are no signifi-
cant countervailing considerations. 
VIII. As a result of Manivest's willful, persistent 
defaults, the Howes are entitled to recover their costs, 
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expenses, and reasonable attorneys' fees. The costs, expenses 
and fees were awarded in accordance with a valid contract. 
IX. Manivest's failure to properly maintain the improve-
ments violated the lease. Maintenance of the improvements was 
clearly Manivest's duty under the Lease. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The trial court's findings are substantial and specific. 
The court considered the testimony of the witnesses carefully and 
weighed the evidence. The evidence is uncontested that Manivest 
sought no permission and gave no notice to the Howes of any of 
the prior assignments or encumbrances. The evidence is equally 
clear that Manivest took no timely action to remedy any of the 
defaults when requested to do so. The record is unchallenged. 
Manivest persistently and willfully refused to cure. Notably, 
Manivest does not contest the fact of default. 
Manivest focuses instead on contesting particular defaults 
in an attempt to limit the defaults to so few matters that it can 
argue for a different remedy. With respect to the findings ques-
tioned by Manivest, it has the burden to show that the finding is 
against the clear weight of the evidence. Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha, Inc., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). 
-23-
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF 
MANIVEST'S NUMEROUS DEFAULTS. MANIVEST WAS 
NOT SURPRISED. 
This Court's policy is to allow cases to be decided on the 
merits and not on the basis of pleading technicalities. Guardian 
State Bank v. Stanql, 778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1989). 
Manivest claims that it was surprised by evidence offered by 
the Howes at trial "for the first time without notice" O.B. 3. 
Manivest makes this claim even though all of the documentary 
evidence offered at trial, as set forth above, was identified on 
exhibit lists provided to Manivest well in advance of trial. 
Moreover, Manivest made no objection until the "surprise 
evidence" was introduced at trial. Manivest also makes the claim 
in spite of the fact that the "surprise evidence" was from its 
own files. 
Manivest was given fair notice. The Howes' Complaint 
alleged: 
19. Defendants have willfully disregarded their 
obligations under the Lease and have sought to obtain 
economic advantage from breaching it in ways calculated 
to disadvantage the plaintiffs. 
20. Despite repeated requests by plaintiffs, 
defendants have willfully failed to keep and perform 
their covenants and obligations under the Lease. 
22. Upon information and belief, defendants have 
failed and refused and neglected to maintain the 
Premises in good condition as required by the Lease, 
and the Premises, including, but not limited to, the 
improvements thereon, are in need of substantial 
maintenance and repairs. 
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Paragraph 49 contained general allegations of failure to keep and 
perform "obligations described in, among other paragraphs, para-
graph 6 of the Lease/' which prohibits all liens and encumbrances 
of any nature whatsoever. ^^ Paragraph 34 alleged general 
24 
violations of paragraph 4, which prohibits assignments Id. 
Finally, Manivest makes this claim even though it served no 
interrogatories asking the Howes to outline their evidence, and 
even though it certified to the court its readiness for trial and 
accused the Howes of delay.25 With respect to the Liquidating 
Trust, Manivest knew of the Howes* interest in that document and 
identified it as one of its own trial exhibits. (R. 391, 804.) 
Since Manivest deposed Mr. Leonard's, his testimony could not 
have been a surprise. (Appendix A.) 
Given the clear notice from the pleadings, the exhibit lists 
the deposition of Mr. Leonard, the lack of discovery by Manivest, 
The Howes filed a Rule 15(b) motion to amend the pleadings to 
conform to the evidence. R. 434. Manivest did not respond in opposition. 
The purpose of Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is to permit 
the case to be tried on its merits so that the parties may receive all the 
relief to which they are entitled, without a multiplicity of suits. In the 
interests of justice, such amendments should be liberally allowed, even when 
the evidence is objected to on the grounds that it raises issues not framed by 
the pleadings. Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984); Redevelopment 
Agency v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112, 1125 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Thus, a motion 
to amend raised, even at trial, in response to acts discovered subsequent to 
the original pleadings "should be allowed if there is a reasonable explanation 
for the delay in discovering the facts and the amendment is not unduly 
prejudicial to the opposing party." Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 820 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
25 
After listening to Manivest's strident requests that the case be 
tried quickly so as to not prolong a stalemate, the court put the parties' 
feet to the fire, setting the trial date within 50 days and ordering the 
parties promptly to complete discovery and exchange exhibit lists. (R. 344.) 
At trial, Manivest did an "about face" and argued for a continuance which 
would have prolonged the stalemate. Tr. 50, 1. 12-18. 
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and the fact that the "surprise evidence" came from Manivest's 
files, the court properly admitted the evidence. As stated in 
Am. Jur. 2d: 
The rule requiring certainty in pleadings is very 
greatly relaxed when the matter in reference to which 
the pleading is claimed to be uncertain is peculiarly 
within the knowledge of the party attacking it; neither 
party is required to state with particularity matters 
which are wholly within the knowledge of the adverse 
party. A defendant, therefore, cannot be heard to 
complain of uncertainty in the allegations of the 
complaint in respect to matters peculiarly within his 
knowledge unless the averments are so uncertain as not 
to disclose the essential elements of the cause of 
action he is required to answer, or are so vague and 
indefinite that they cannot be said to state any cause 
of action sufficient to warrant a recovery. 
61A Am. Jr. 2d Pleading § 34, p.45 (1963). (Emphasis added.) 
The trial court excluded considerable evidence which the 
Howes sought to present.26 But the evidence the Court admitted 
was properly disclosed and within the scope of the pleadings. 
Manivest had no factual or legal basis upon which to claim 
surprise. 
III. 
MANIVEST REPEATEDLY ASSIGNED THE LEASE IN 
VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 4. 
A review of paragraph 4 shows plainly that it cannot be used 
by Manivest to justify its actions. It is not justification for 
its so-called "paper transfers". It does not render assignments 
For example, the court excluded documentary evidence and testimony 
of expert witnesses regarding the physical condition of the shopping center 
improvements and the need for maintenance. (Tr. 226 1.1-6.) This particular 
ruling is the subject of the cross appeal. (Tr. 192.) 
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void. Furthermore, it does not create an implied duty to consent 
to assignment. Finally, there is no factual support for the 
argument that the Howes objected to the transfers to obtain 
increased rents.27 
a. Manivest Cannot Deny the Transfers. 
Each of the transfers was made for consideration (Ex. 22). 
Each of the transfers was duly executed. Manivest admitted that 
it benefited from the transfers (T. 321 1.17-19.) The claim that 
since Manivest was the general partner in two of the assignees, 
the transfers were exempt from paragraph 4 is not supported in 
fact. Further, Manivest's claim that the other transfer was to a 
wholly owned subsidiary is not supported by evidence, and does 
not make the transfer ineffective. Remarkably, in the 
Liquidating Trust, Manivest admits the Lease prohibition against 
assignment is valid when it states: 
All of the assets owned by the partnership 
(Diversified) were held in the name of Professional 
Manivest, Inc., rather than in the partnership name. 
Since the Trust was formed these properties, except 
Southlake Shopping Center because of the land lease 
restriction . . . are now vested in the partnership 
name.28 (Ex. 40) 
b. The Transfers Were Not Void. 
Manivest attempts to blur the distinction between 
"assignment" and an "encumbrance." An assignment differs from an 
Manivest has never addressed the fact that the assignment to the 
Liquidating Trust violates paragraph 4 of the Lease as well as paragraph 11. 
2b 
Ex. 40 Note 1 to Diversified Realty Investments Limited Notes to 
the Balance Sheet 12/31/87. 
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encumbrance. "An assignment i s a t ransfe r by a tenant of his 
e n t i r e i n t e r e s t in the l ease . I t i s a t r ans fe r of i t s e n t i r e 
term and ' e s t a t e . ' " 1 M. Friedman, On Leases, S 7.401 (1990). 
An "encumbrance" on the other hand does not t r ans fe r the e s t a t e 
but c rea tes in favor of a th i rd party a burden or l imi t a t ion on 
the e s t a t e . 
Paragraph 4 allowed the or ig ina l tenant to assign the Lease 
to a corporat ion; however, beyond that or ig ina l assignment, the 
pa r t i e s agreed tha t the t enan t ' s i n t e r e s t "shal l be unassignable 
except with the pr io r consent of the [Howes]." (Ex. 1.) 
In I960, when the Lease began, the common law did not impose 
a "reasonableness" standard on a landlord ' s r igh t to withhold 
consent to an assignment of a l ease . The weight of au thor i ty in 
the United States allowed landlords " a r b i t r a r i l y " to withhold 
c o n s e n t / Even today, t h i s remains the majority view: 
When the r e s t r a in ing clause says, without qua l i f i ca -
t ion , tha t the land lord ' s consent i s required for the 
t e n a n t ' s t r ans fe r , then i t i s qui te general ly held tha t 
he may withhold consent without having to give a 
reason. 
R. Cunningham, The Law of Property; § 6.69, p. 386 (West 1984). 
The R e p o r t e r ' s note t o the Restatement Second of P rope r ty , 
Landlord and Tenant, § 15.2 (he rea f t e r "Restatement § 15.2") s t a t e s : 
The r u l e , . . t h a t t he landlord may not unreasonably withhold h i s 
consent t o a t r a n s f e r by t he t enan t i s con t r a ry t o t he e s t a b l i s h e d 
common-lav; r u l e t h a t if t h e l ea se mandates t he consent of t h e 
land lord t o v a l i d a t e a t r a n s f e r , and the l e a se does not p rovide 
the l and lord t o give consent i f t he t r a n s f e r e e i s reasonably 
s u i t a b l e , such consent may be withheld a r b i t r a r i l y by t h e l and-
l o r d . 
Id . at 111. (Emphasis added.) 
- 2 8 -
This case does not require the court to decide whether to 
create or adopt a minority rule. The law clearly does not create 
such an obligation, because Manivest assigned the Lease before 
seeking consent. In Comment (g) to Restatement § 15.2# the 
Reporter states: 
[I]f a party to the lease proceeds to make a transfer 
of an interest in the leased property in violation of 
the restraint on alienation imposed on him without 
first seeking the other party's consent, the transfer 
will be in violation of the restraint even though the 
transferring party might be able to prove that the 
other party would have had no reasonable basis for 
objecting to the transfer. 
Id. at 104. (Emphasis added.) 
Paragraph 4 of the Lease does not merely create a "disabling 
restraint." Manivestfs only authority for this novel argument, 
which was an afterthought, at best, is a Comment in the 
Restatement which defines a disabling restraint as one that 
"makes an attempt to transfer . . . without the landlord's 
consent a nullity."31 In this case, nothing in the Lease 
There was no question put to any of the witnesses as to whether an 
unauthorized transfer was a nullity. The disabling restraint argument was not 
raised in pleadings or any argument except in the brief which Manivest 
submitted in lieu of closing argument. 
The Restatement gives no examples of the language required to 
create a disabling restraint, except in the case of donative transfers. Each 
of those examples either specifically states that the transfer is null and 
void or states that a particular person is either prohibited or does not have 
the power to transfer. Such language is notably lacking in the Lease. 
Although the Opening Brief contains no other authority for its disabling 
restraint argument, Manivest has previously relied on Shields v. W.G. Moffitt, 
683 P.2d 530 (Okla. 1984). That case can be readily distinguished. It 
involved an oil and gas lease which was automatically renewable and which the 
court therefore considered to be nearly the equivalent of a fee interest. 
Shields also depended upon the interpretation of an Oklahoma statute, which 
led the court to conclude that the parties intended to create a "contingent 
remainder in the lessor." Moreover, the Shields lease did not even provide 
the remedy of forfeiture in the event of a breach. The court's holding was 
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suggests that the parties intended an unauthorized transfer to be 
a nullity. Certainly, Manivest would not make that argument if 
the IRS were seeking to disallow the tax benefits that Manivest 
created by transferring the Lease from one entity to another. 
Nor would it make that argument if a creditor now were attempting 
to recover assets directly from Manivest or from Diversified 
instead of proceeding against the Liquidating Trust. Having 
obtained benefits from the transfer, Manivest is precluded from 
arguing otherwise. Not once during the trial did any of 
Manivest' s witness suggest that any of the assignments were 
"void." 
In order to turn paragraph 4 into a disabling restraint, 
Manivest must convince this court that 110 obligation in the Lease 
is a "covenant" unless it is preceded by that word. This 
strained construction is nonsense. For example, there would be 
no enforceable obligation that the tenant pay taxes or utilities, 
and the Howes would have a "right" to inspect but no enforcement 
ability. These obligations are not specifically referred to as 
"covenants." (Ex. 1, 5ITi 2, 7.) When considered in its entirety, 
the Lease shows an intent to provide the remedy of termination 
for the breach of any of the tenant's obligations. 
Sound construction of the entire document leads to a far 
more reasonable result. The first sentence of the "WITNESSETH" 
clause of the Lease recites that it is made for and in 
that a naked restraint without any provisions dealing with forfeiture or 
reversion, was a disabling restraint. 
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considerat ion of "the covenants and agreements here inaf te r 
mentioned to be kept, paid and performed." The p a r t i e s thereby 
agreed tha t a l l of the obl igat ions thereaf te r mentioned were 
"covenants and agreements/1 including the obl igat ion tha t the 
Lease "shal l be unassignable." 
Manivest 's sec re t ive t rans fe rs are not j u s t i f i e d by the 
cases upon which Manivest r e l i e s . 3 2 In Kendall v. Ernest 
Pestana, I n c . , 709 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1985), the tenants sought the 
l and lord ' s consent before assigning the Lease. Where the 
opposite occurs, i t appears the Lease may be terminated. 
Healthco, Inc. v. E&S Realty Association, 400 Mass. 700, 511 
N.E.2d 579 (1987) . 
Manivest 's r e l i ance upon Prince v. Elm Investments Co., 649 
P.2d 820 (Utah 1982) i s misplaced. In Prince, the issue was 
whether the t e n a n t ' s r igh t of f i r s t refusal took effect when the 
landlord t ransfer red i t s i n t e r e s t to a par tnership in which the 
landlord had a majority i n t e r e s t but not complete con t ro l . The 
court considered the elements necessary to c rea te a "sa le" for 
purposes of invoking a "r ight of f i r s t r e f u s a l . " Manivest claims 
In Campbell v. Vtestdahl, 715 P.2d 288 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) The 
landlord — a successor to the or ig ina l owner — bla tant ly withheld consent to 
transfer the l ease in order to charge addit ional rent for outdoor areas 
despi te the fact that the or ig ina l landlord had agreed not t o do so . 
Furthermore, the tenant provided the landlord with relevant f inancia l data 
about the proposed assignment. The Campbell court noted that an owner i s 
under no duty to seek out information concerning the proposed assignment, and 
in the absence of such information Mis j u s t i f i e d in withholding consent ." Id. 
at 293. F ina l ly , in Campbell the lease assignment was express ly "contingent 
upon the l e s s o r ' s consent and [became] e f f e c t i v e upon rece ipt in writ ing of 
the l e s s o r ' s consent." Id. at 296. This avoided the rule referred to in 
Comment (g) to Restatement § 15 .2 . Prestin v. Mobil Oil Corp., 741 F.2d 268 
(9th Cir. 1984) merely stands for the proposit ion that the l e s sor must act 
reasonably and in good f a i t h . The Howes did. Finding 29, 30. 
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without any documentary evidence such as partnership agreements 
that although these transfers introduced strangers to the Lease, 
the strangers did not have substantial control over the leased 
property so the transfer is not a sale, Manivest has submitted 
no authority for that proposition. The Howes respectfully submit 
that a transfer for value of a significant interest to a stranger 
violates the prohibition against assignments particularly where, 
as here, the stranger thereby gained a substantial economic 
benefit. 
c. The Claims Made by Manivest are Specious and Self-
Serving. 
This lawsuit is not about rent. It is about fairness and 
observance of agreements. In a desperate attempt to divert 
attention from its inequitable conduct, Manivest repeatedly 
claims this is a "strike suit" by the Howes to get more rent. 
Certainly, Manivest's duplicity in leveraging the Lease for 
external capital purposes does not support this claim. Its 
position is not supported by either Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco, 
Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 (Utah 1980) or Ted R. Brown and Associates, 
Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964 (Ut. App. Ct. 1988). In each 
of these cases, the court ruled against the party that asserted 
the breach of the implied covenant of good faith. 
A duty of good faith does not mean that a party vested 
with a clear right is obligated to exercise that right 
to its own detriment for the purpose of benefiting 
another party to the contract. 
Rio Algom, supra, at 505. (Emphasis added.) 
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IV. 
MANIVEST'S LOAN TRANSACTIONS VIOLATED THE 
PROHIBITION AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES. 
Unlike an assignment which involves a transfer to a third 
person of an entire estate, an encumbrance is any right which is 
created in favor of a third person and which is a burden or 
limitation on the estate. General Glass Corp. v. Mast Const. 
Corp., 766 P.2d 429 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The term "encumbrance" has been broadly defined. Berqstrom 
v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1984). Berqstrom noted, in 
interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (warranties in warranty 
deeds) that where fee title is conveyed an encumbrance is "any 
right that a third person holds which constitutes a burden or 
1 imitation upon the rights of the fee titleholder." ^d* This 
definition is meant to be expansive, and includes "mortgages, tax 
liens, labor and materialmen•s liens" as well as easements and 
other servitudes. 
Further, an assignment of a lease for security purposes is a 
mortgage of a lease. E.g., Slane v. Polar Oil Co., 41 P.2d 490 
(Wyo. 1935); Harbel Oil Co. v. Steele, 318 P.2d 359 (Ariz. 
1957).33 It is, therefore, axiomatic that a landlord may forbid 
the tenant from mortgaging or otherwise encumbering the leasehold 
estate. 
An encumbrance may attach to either a leasehold interest, a fee 
interest, or both. Under Utah law, all rights or estates in land, including a 
leasehold estate, may be mortgaged. See Utah Code Ann. S 57-1-1 et seq.; see 
also Bybee v. Stuart, 189 P.2d 118 (Utah 1948). 
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It is clear that the Lease prohibited all the Manivest 
encumbrances. Paragraph 14 of the Lease for example addressed 
encumbrances for the construction of the original improvements. 
This paragraph protected the Howes from personal liability on 
construction loans and prohibited speculative borrowings. It 
required that any improvements be constructed for immediate 
occupancy, pursuant to a signed sublease. Upon these conditions, 
construction loans for the original improvements could encumber 
the interests of both the tenant and the Howes. During the 
1960's, the parties created several such loans. (Ex. 3.) 
Paragraph 14, however, did not address all financing issues. 
For example, it did not discuss either the Howes' ability to 
borrow against their own reversionary interest, nor did it 
address any of the other encumbrances which a tenant could 
create, either through acts or omissions. 
The parties treated these issues in paragraphs 19 and 6. In 
paragraph 19, the Howes agreed not to mortgage their reversionary 
interest or otherwise encumber the "title to the property." As 
the quid pro quo, in paragraph 6 the tenant agreed that except 
for the construction loans permitted by paragraph 14, it would 
"keep the demised premises free and clear of all liens or 
encumbrances of any nature whatsoever." (Emphasis added.) 
Despite the breadth of this language, Manivest asserts that 
34 
In its Brief, Manivest repeatedly fails to correctly quote' paragraph 6 
of the Lease. In an apparent effort to narrowly interpret this broad 
provision, Manivest first leaves out the words "of any nature whatsoever" 
(O.B. 13) and next leaves out the word "all." (O.B. 29.) 
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the Lease only prohibited it from encumbrancing the Howes* inter-
est in the land. But in construing the Lease, an interpretation 
must be adopted, if possible, to give effect to every clause. 
Thomas J. Peck & Sons v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 515 P.2d 446 
(Utah 1973). The interpretation urged by Manivest makes the 
covenant in paragraph 6 illusory. 
"Demised premises" as used in paragraph 6 cannot mean merely 
the Howes' fee interest in the land. Paragraph 14 required the 
Howes to subordinate not the "demised premises," but to sub-
ordinate their "interest in the land." Moreover, unless an owner 
agrees to subordinate, a tenant has no right to encumber the 
owner's fee interest. Therefore, if the words "demised premises" 
in paragraph 6 meant only the Howes' fee interest, paragraph 6 
would have been completely unnecessary and meaningless. Para-
graph 14 and the legal principle that a tenant cannot encumber 
the owner's fee interest without the owner's consent would have 
completely protected the Howes from the tenant's financing 
activities. 
Further support is found in paragraph 4, which grants 
permission to sublease, but expressly forbids the tenant from 
binding the "fee interest of the [Howes]." These words are not 
found in Paragraph 6. The term "demised premises" as used in 
paragraph 6 plainly means any interest or real property right, 
including Manivest's leasehold estate. In the broadest of terms, 
paragraph 6 prohibits "all liens and encumbrances of any nature 
whatsoever." 
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Paragraph 6 played an important r o l e . I t not only protected 
the Howes' reversionary e s t a t e , but a lso meant tha t a f inanc ia l ly 
responsible tenant would remain in possession. The Lease thus 
l e f t no room for a bank to "worm" i t s way in to the deal to claim 
the r en ta l income from the subleases . The Lease prohibi ted 
Manivest from mortgaging i t s leasehold and thereby impeding the 
Howes1 contractual r igh t to co l l ec t ren ts in the event t ha t 
Manivest vacated the Property or was removed therefrom. (Ex. 1, 
Read separa te ly , read in the context of appl icable rea l 
e s t a t e p r i n c i p l e s , and read together , paragraphs 6, 14 and 19 can 
have only one meaning: I t was a breach of the Lease for Manivest 
to encumber any rea l e s t a t e i n t e r e s t whatsoever, without the 
Howes' knowledge and consent. All of these paragraphs were 
e s s e n t i a l . They were a comprehensive attempt to deal with a l l of 
the various financing issues which could a r i s e during the term of 
the Lease. 
The p rac t i ca l consequence of t h i s s t ruc tu re was tha t the 
pa r t i e s would be required to negotiate if e i t he r wanted to use 
In Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 104 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. 1960), the 
landlord success fu l ly terminated the lease and retook possess ion . Afterwards, 
when the landlord could not recover unpaid rent from the tenant, the landlord 
sued the corporation to whom the tenant had assigned i t s r ight t o rece ive 
rents from subtenants. The court held that the landlord could not enforce the 
lease and c o l l e c t rents from the assignee who had taken the assignment of 
subrents as securi ty for a debt. If anything, the Baehr case further 
i l l u s t r a t e s why the Howes had good reason to prohibit such assignments in the 
Lease. In Chapman v. Great Western Gypsum, Co., 14 P.2d 750 (Cal. 1932), the 
court only considered whether a mortgage on a lease v io la ted a prohibi t ion 
against assignments. The lease did not include any other r e s t r i c t i o n s against 
encumbrances. 
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i t s respect ive i n t e r e s t for financing purposes other than for the 
o r ig ina l improvements.36 Rather than dealing with t h i s financing 
problem in a s traightforward way, Manivest borrowed for i t s own 
benefi t and without informing the Howes. 
Other courts have upheld t h i s concept. In Airport Plaza, 
Inc. v. Blanchard, 234 Cal. Rptr. 198 (Cal. App. 1987), the 
successor to the or ig ina l master tenant on a 75-year ground lease 
claimed the r igh t to mortgage i t s leasehold i n t e r e s t , without the 
owner's consent. The owner had subordinated to the construct ion 
of the or ig ina l improvements. Of the two per t inen t paragraphs in 
the Airport Plaza lease , one addressed the "hypothecations" for 
construct ing the or ig ina l improvements. The other merely s t a t ed : 
Except as otherwise provided in t h i s l ease , lessee 
sha l l not t r ans fe r or assign t h i s lease in whole or in 
pa r t , or i t s i n t e r e s t hereunder . . . without receiving 
the pr ior wri t ten consent of l e s sor . 
Id. at 201. The tenant argued tha t because the Lease did not 
expressly forbid leasehold financing a f te r completion of the 
improvements, hypothecation of the t e n a n t ' s leasehold i n t e r e s t 
must be freely permitted. Id. 
These paragraphs recognized the inheren t u n c e r t a i n t i e s of a long-
term l e a s e which did not o therwise address p o t e n t i a l changes in economic 
c i r cums tances . For example, t h e r e were no percentage r e n t s and no cos t of 
l i v i n g ad jus tments . Ex. 1. Consequently, a t t he t ime of t r i a l t h e t o t a l 
amount t h a t would have been payable as r en t was not $24,000 per year as 
a l l eged by Manivest , but approximately $12,000 per yea r . (R. 701) . This was 
the b a s i s for the Howe's a l l e g a t i o n s in Paragraph 17 and 18 of t h e Complaint. 
(R. 2 . ) See Airpor t P laza , I nc . v. Blanchard, 234 Cal . Rpt r . 198 (Cal . App. 
1987). This case i s not l i k e Bonanza, I nc . v. McLean, 747 P.2d 792 (Kan. 
1967) where t h e t enan t sought f inancing only t o c o n s t r u c t a d d i t i o n a l improve-
ments. The l e s s o r c l e a r l y had agreed t o subord ina te for t h i s purpose . The 
cour t had no t r o u b l e f inding t h a t the t e n a n t ' s f inancing was "for t h e purpose 
of c a r ry ing out t he o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s . " Id. a t 796. In 
Bonanza t h e r e was no r e fe rence t o any o ther p r o h i b i t i o n in t h e l e a s e aga in s t 
e i t h e r assignments or encumbrances. 
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The court rejected this argument and ruled that the prohibi-
tion against a transfer of an interest under the lease applied to 
leasehold financing. The language in the Airport Plaza lease is 
no more comprehensive than the language of paragraphs 4, 6, 14 
and 19 of the Howes* Lease. 
The evidence is undisputed that Manivest created the follow-
ing encumbrances on property interests associated with the Lease: 
1. The 1978 First Security Loan for $1,000,000, 
evidenced by both a Trust Deed and an Assignment of 
Rents and Leases. (Ex. 11.) 
2. The 1982 Valley Bank loan for $488,000 
evidenced by an Assignment of the Lease and all the 
subleases. (Ex. 13 & 14.) 
3. The 1987-88 Valley Bank loan for $4,000,000, 
evidenced by a Deed of Trust (with all encompassing 
lien language) and an Assignment of the Lease, both of 
which were recorded, an Assignment of all the 
subleases, as well as a recorded UCC-1 Financing 
Statement. (Ex. 17 . ) 
All of these occurred without the Howes' knowledge or consent and 
were prohibited by the Lease. 
Moreover, Manivest repeatedly attempted to do more than 
merely encumber its leasehold interest. Pursuant to the Lease, 
the Howes, not some third party bank, were expressly entitled to 
the sublease income in the event that Manivest abandoned or 
vacated the property or was removed therefrom. (Ex. 1, 51 10.) 
Yet, at trial, the bank's counsel testified repeatedly that the 
bank claimed those rents. (E.g. Tr. 250, 1. 15-19.) Indeed, 
after the trial, the bank attempted to intervene in order to 
enforce that claim. (R. 515.) 
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Finally, Manivest added insult to injury when it attempted 
first to persuade and later, intimidate the Howes into signing 
the Acknowledgement. The Acknowledgement recited that for the 
loan in question the Howes1 consent "was required by the Lease." 
(Emphasis added.) This, viewed in context with the testimony at 
trial, the form of the Loan Agreement, the fact that the Trust 
Deed had already been recorded against the Property, and the fact 
that the Howes had never previously consented to loans other than 
to construct the original improvements, demonstrates convincingly 
that the $4,000,000 loan was a surreptitious attempt to encumber 
the Howes' fee interest. 
V. 
MANIVEST VIOLATED THE LEASE BY MAKING AN 
ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. 
A v o l u n t a r y a s s i g n m e n t of a l e a s e h o l d e s t a t e by a l e s s e e , 
f o r t h e b e n e f i t of i t s c r e d i t o r s , i s a b r e a c h of a g e n e r a l 
p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t a s s i g n m e n t s . 49 Am. J u r . 2d , L a n d l o r d T e n a n t 
§ 418 ( 1 9 6 3 ) . 3 ? The default is even clearer where the lease also 
contains a specific prohibition against assignments for the 
benefit of creditors. In this case, paragraph 11 of the Lease 
In Medinah Temple Co. v. Currey, 44 N.E. 839, 840 (111. 1896), the 
court considered t h i s s p e c i f i c i s s u e . The lease contained a general prohibi -
t ion against assignments of the lease and provided for for fe i ture i f the 
condition was broken. The l e s s e e made a general voluntary assignment for the 
benefi t of h is cred i tor s , whereupon the landlord sought t o declare the l ease 
f o r f e i t e d . The t r i a l court ruled in favor of the tenant; however, the Supreme 
Court of I l l i n o i s reversed, s ta t ing : MWe enterta in no doubt that the volun-
tary assignment, under the law of t h i s s t a t e , was a v i o l a t i o n of the condit ion 
against ass igning ." Ijd. at 840. (Emphasis added.) 
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expressly prohibited such assignments and, in such event, 
provided that the Howes could "terminate this Lease." (Ex. 1.) 
Manivest's argument that an assignment to the Liquidating 
Trust did not take effect is without merit. Manivest's position 
is not supported by either the trust instrument or the substan-
tive evidence received by the court. 
The fact that an assignment to the Manivest Liquidating 
Trust ("Trust") was made is demonstrated by the trust document 
and admissions of Manivest. In Exhibit 40, the introduction to 
the trust document provides: 
1. "Recently the Manivest Group of Companies 
resigned as General Partner of all partnerships, formed 
the Manivest Liquidating Trust, and wishes to now 
substitute the Trust as General Partner." (Ex. 40, p. 
1.) (Emphasis added) 
2. "The Manivest Group (which is comprised of 
Manivest Corporation, Manivest Investments, Inc., 
Professional Manivest, Inc., and Westco Realty, Inc. 
has now assigned all of its assets and obligations to 
the Trust . . . " (Ex. 40, p. 2.) 
3. "The Trustees' plan is to negotiate with the 
secured creditors to permit an orderly distribution to 
the unsecured creditors. Although the current expec-
tation is that the new assets will generate sufficient 
funds to repay all creditors in full, there can be no 
assurance that this will be possible, as current debt 
exceeds the estimated present value of the assets. 
. . . (Ex. 40, p. 3). (Emphasis added) 
The Trust document itself provides: 
It is understood and agreed that the assets received 
and to be received pursuant to this Trust Agreement may 
not be sufficient to satisfy all of the claims of the 
Beneficiaries and other Bona Fide Creditors . . . " 
(Ex. 40, p. 4 of Trust.) The Trust does not provide for a direct 
assignment of Southlake Shopping Center to the Trust but does 
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provide in Section 3.1, pp. 11 and 12 that Manivest " . . . shall 
retire as the general partner and appoint the Trust as the 
successor general partner of each of the following partnerships: 
. . . Diversified Investments, Ltd., . . ." 
The impeachment of Mr. Leeper at trial provides the final 
assurances necessary: (T. 285-287) 
Q. Do you have any direct dealings with the organi-
zation of Manivest at this point in connection 
with your running of the South Lake Shopping 
Center? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You do? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have direct connections with them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall in your deposition that you said 
that you only dealt with Manivest through the 
liquidating trust? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which answer is correct? Do you deal directly 
with Manivest or do you deal with them only 
through the liquidating trust? 
A. Both. I am a trustee. 
Q. Let me read your deposition again on page 14, 
starting on line 5. 
"Question: Do you have any dealings directly with 
Professional Manivest, Inc.? 
"Answer: Directly through the trust. 
"Question: Oh, only through the trust? 
"Answer: Right. 
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"Question: I don't want to get into a semantical 
contest with you. I want to understand what your 
understanding is. Only through the trust? 
"Answer: Through the trust." 
Did you give those answers to those questions? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't correct that portion of your testimony, 
did you? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Is it true then, Mr. Leeper, that your contact or 
your involvement with the management of the South 
Lake Shopping Center is through the liquidating 
trust; isn't that right? 
A. Yes, that's correct. 
Q. Not through the people that were officers and 




THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
ENCROACHMENTS WERE UNAUTHORIZED ENCUMBRANCES. 
The evidence upon which Manivest relies to assert that 
certain land was not owned by the Howes (O.B. 14), was not even 
offered until Manivest filed a motion for new trial. (R. 1041.) 
But more importantly, that evidence ignored the issue. 
The Howes alleged that Manivest had allowed encroachments 
onto the leased property. The Quitclaim Deed was uncontroverted 
evidence of that fact. The Howes knew nothing of its delivery by 
Manivest. The deed stated in part: 
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The grantee accepts this Deed and by doing so acknowl-
edges that the improvements located on the property 
described in Exhibit "A" encroach onto the land parcel 
leased by the grantor [Manivest]. (Emphasis added.) 
Manivest offered no evidence that it leased any other property in 
the vicinity. 
Manivest's argument that an ''encroachment" is "something 
quite different than an 'encumbrance'" because an encroachment 
"exists without a claim of a right to the property being 
encroached upon" is without merit. According to Professor Powell 
certain encumbrances "involve physical facts concerning the 
premises." He further states: 
An encumbrance concerns physical facts when it consists 
of building restrictions, encroachments, easements or 
profits, agreements as to party walls, or fences, or 
reserved mineral rights. 
R. Powell, The Law of Real Property, J 898 (1987). 
Manivest consented to the trial of the encroachment issue. 
Moreover, Manivest elected not to introduce evidence to contra-
dict the Quitclaim Deed, thereby waiving any objection. Upton v. 
Heiselt, 223 P.2d 428 (Utah 1950). 
If the Howes now were to convey the property without either 
excluding the area of the encroachments or disclosing the 
encroachments, this court would have no trouble finding that the 
Howes had thereby violated Utah Code Annotated, § 57-1-12. Eg. 
Berqstrom v. Moore, supra. Clearly, encroachments are encum-
brances. Moreover, it is well settled that an "easement" is an 
encumbrance. Thus, if the adjacent landowner's right in the 
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encroachments were to mature into an easement by prescription, 
the encroachments would be an encumbrance. Worse yet, if that 
right were to mature through adverse possession into an actual 
claim of title, the Howes would be deprived of the fee interest 
in that portion of the property. 
VII. 
THE JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE IS APPROPRIATE AND 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
T h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n from t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t M a n i v e s t 
d e f a u l t e d u n d e r t h e L e a s e . There i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t M a n i v e s t 
engaged i n i n e q u i t a b l e c o n d u c t . I t s t i l l n o n e t h e l e s s p r o t e s t s 
t h e f o r f e i t u r e and hopes t h a t t h e c o l l e c t i v e c o n s c i e n c e of t h i s 
c o u r t w i l l be shocked even though t h e t r i a l c o u r t , a f t e r o b s e r v -
ing t h e w i t n e s s e s , s p e c i f i c a l l y found t h a t i t s c o n s c i e n c e was 
n o t . In an a t t e m p t t o p rovoke t h i s C o u r t , M a n i v e s t g l o s s e s o v e r 
i t s s h o r t c o m i n g s and o v e r t h e f a c t i t t ook no t i m e l y a c t i o n t o 
c u r e . I t s c l a i m of e x c e s s i v e v a l u e i s a n o t h e r i l l u s t r a t i o n . The 
t r i a l c o u r t found : 
2 6 . C o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e was o f f e r e d p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e 
v a l u e of t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' l e a s e h o l d e s t a t e . The most 
c r e d i b l e and b e l i e v a b l e e v i d e n c e was p r o v i d e d by 
w i t n e s s C h a r l e s Huber , C .P .A. and E x h i b i t " 4 2 . " T h i s 
e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t t h e c u r r e n t v a l u e of t h e 
d e f e n d a n t s ' l e a s e h o l d e s t a t e i s be tween $500 ,000 and 
$ 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 3 8 
Whatever t h e value of t he c a p i t a l improvements, t h e t e n a n t s ' 
i n t e r e s t could not exceed t h i s p ro jec t ed cash flow v a l u e . Upon any t e rmina -
t i o n of t h e Leasee, t h e Howes were e n t i t l e d t o t h e shopping c e n t e r b u i l d i n g s . 
Thus Manivest e r r s by sugges t ing r epea ted ly t h a t t he va lue of t h e improvements 
was t o be considered in a d d i t i o n t o the cash flow v a l u e . O.B. 4; 42. 
Moreover, t he f o r f e i t u r e of t he improvements contemplated by the p a r t i e s t o 
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Next Manivest proclaims without citing any authority that 
the Howes must prove numerical damages even though the fact of 
great harm to the Howes is established• The Court in effect made 
the necessary determination when it found the defaults were 
meaningful and important under the terms of the Lease. 
It may be argued that forfeiture always produces harsh 
results. Notwithstanding, the Utah courts have sustained the 
judgment of the trial court and enforced the forfeiture of 
numerous leases. E.q./ I.X.L. Furniture & Carpet Installment 
House v. Berets, 91 P. 279 (Utah 1907) (despite the "equities" 
and the tenant's "mere oversight"); Jacobson v. Swan, 278 P.2d 
294 (Utah 1954) (court did not even discuss the materiality of 
the breach); Pinqree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 
1317 (Utah 1976) (the Utah Supreme Court has "consistently ruled 
a notice of forfeiture is sufficient to terminate a lease for 
breach of a covenant"). 
Utah courts have been particularly unsympathetic to tenants 
who have repeatedly defaulted or have procrastinated and not 
taken advantage of grace periods. Allred v. Smith, 674 P.2d 99 
(Utah 1983) (the tenant made no effort to take advantage of the 
grace period); Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 548 P.2d 889 
(Utah 1976), cert, denied 429 U.S. 860 (1976) (tender of perfor-
mance not timely); Shoemaker v. Pioneer Investments, 381 P.2d 735 
the lease. The trial court was entitled to take into account that loss to 
which Manivest had already agreed when deciding whether to forfeit the lease. 
See a!so footnote 4, supra. 
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(Utah 1963) (after notice of termination, tenant still failed to 
pay taxes and gave NSF checks); Ute-Cal Land Development v. 
Intermountain Stock Exchange, 628 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981) (tenant 
repeatedly defaulted); Bacon v. Park, 57 P. 28 (Utah 1899) 
(tenant's delay in curing a default under a 20-year lease when 
the tenant knew of the default f,was a gross violation of the 
covenants of the lease1'). 
Manivest's conduct was willful. It was persistent and 
inequitable. Manivest took advantage and was quilty of over-
reaching and exploitation. The long-term one-sided way in which 
it used the Lease could not be equitably explained or condoned. 
Its purposeful efforts to gain advantage over the Howes in the 
1988 Valley Bank loan were not an accident. 
Although the verbiage of Bacon v. Park, supra, is now over 
90 years old, it still has profound meaning: 
Equity will not relieve against a forfeiture of a lease 
where the breach of the covenants have been so 
culpable, long persisted in and indeterminable as the 
evidence in this case shows the breaches to have been. 
Id. at 30. The judgment was clearly appropriate and necessary. 
VIII. 
AS A RESULT OF MANIVEST'S WILLFUL, PERSISTENT 
DEFAULTS, THE HOWES ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
THEIR COSTS, EXPENSES AND FEES. 
The May 18, 1990 Judgment of Forfeiture awarded plaintiffs 
attorney fees and costs "in an amount to be established by a 
supplemental judgment." (R. 1023.) The award of fees, costs and 
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expenses was made on September 10, 1990, in the Supplemental 
Judgment. (R.1293. )39 
Manivest1s attack on the t r i a l court's award ignores the 
c r i t i c a l fact that although i t was timed in accordance with Rule 
54(d), i t was also made "[i]n accordance with the terms of the 
lease ." Rule 54(d). (R. 1296 at 3.) The principal focus of the 
inquiry should thus not be on Rule 54(d) or cases which interpret 
t h i s Rule in a non-contractual s e t t i n g , but on the language of 
the Lease, which s t a t e s : 4 0 
The Lessors and Lessees each agree tha t should they 
defaul t in any of the covenants or agreements contained 
herein , the defaul t ing party shal l pay a l l costs and 
expenses, including reasonable a t t o rney ' s fee, which 
may a r i s e or accrue from enforcing t h i s agreement, or 
in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, 
or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by the 
s t a t u t e s of the State of Utah whether such remedy i s 
pursued by f i l i ng a su i t or otherwise. (Ex. 1, 51 20.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
Application of t h i s simple paragraph completely undermines 
Manivest 's main arguments. For example, Manivest argues tha t the 
award must be reversed if the fo r fe i tu re i s se t a s ide . The 
Lease, however, authorizes the recovery in the event of a 
This two s tep process was necessary because before that judgment 
was entered, Valley Bank f i l e d a motion to intervene. (R. 515.) The motion 
to intervene necess i ta ted substant ia l addit ional work and was s t i l l pending 
when the f i r s t judgment was entered. Moreover, before the t r i a l court ruled 
on the bank's motion, Manivest f i l e d a motion for a new t r i a l and a motion t o 
stay the proceedings to enforce the judgment. (R. 1041, R. 1066.) The court 
was correct to rule on the award of f e e s , co s t s and expenses af ter the l ega l 
s erv ices were subs tant ia l l y complete. 
In Wagner v. Anderson, 250 P.2d 577, 580 (Utah 1952), t h i s court 
recognized that there was "an e s s e n t i a l and basic dif ference" between cases 
involving a contractual right to fees and those involving the normal awarding 
of cos t s under a rule or s t a t u t e , and that the rules appl icable in the l a t t e r 
s i tua t ion do not govern the former. 
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default. There can be no doubt that Manivest persistently 
defaulted. Therefore, even if this court were to overturn the 
trial court's forfeiture decision, it should leave intact the 
supplemental judgment. 
Similarly, Manivest's argument that the fee application was 
untimely is misdirected. The award was consistent with Rule 
54(d) in that it was made prior to or at the same time as the 
supplemental judgment. And since it was made "in accordance with 
the terms of the lease," compliance with the time schedule in 
Rule 54(d) was, strictly speaking, unnecessary. 
Resort to the terms of the Lease also undermines Manivest's 
contention that recovery for expenses such as expert witness fees 
are not authorized by Rule 54(d). The Lease clearly provides for 
the recovery of "all costs and expenses." Rule 54(d) does not 
prevent expert witness fees from being treated as "expenses" in a 
contractual setting. Indeed, such "expenses" are clearly 
recoverable when the parties agree in advance of trial to pay 
them, as they have in this case. Sorenson v. Sorenson, 769 P.2d 
820, 822-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Courts have repeatedly held 
that recoverable "expenses" include expert witness fees and 
deposition costs, as well as photocopying, telephone and travel 
expenses. Wuori v. Concannon, 551 F. Supp. 185, 200-201 (D. Me. 
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1982); Jones v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 912, 
921 (S.D. Ohio 1981) .41 
Moreover, the Howes' Application reflected only a portion of 
the "expenses" which they incurred.42 Given the breadth of the 
contractual language, the Howes are clearly entitled to reim-
bursement for the disputed items. 
Manivest's other arguments are equally unfounded. The 
descriptions of legal services were detailed. The court's own 
Even if Rule 54(d) did control; the Howes would still be entitled 
to recover many of the disputed items. Costs such as deposition costs are 
recoverable, as long as the trial court determines they are reasonably 
necessary. John Price Assoc, v. Davis, 588 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978). The 
Howes deposed three individuals: Messrs. Leeper, Mortensen, and Adamson. 
Each was a key witness, whose testimony and credibility were central to the 
case. Mr. Leeper's deposition was also used for impeachment at trial. To 
judge the necessity of the depositions in hindsight ignores the obvious 
reality that "at the pretrial stage, it may appear to counsel that it cannot 
proceed safely to trial without deposing parties or key witnesses." Kaps 
Transport, Inc. v. Henry, 572 P.2d 72, 79 (Alaska 1977). 
42 
The Howes' expense request was conservative. It did not include 
such items as the time Mr. Steenblik spent preparing for and participating in 
the deposition of John Howe nor additional hours he spent during the week of 
March 5, 1990 in active trial preparation. (R. 1240 at 2.) The Howes also 
did not request reimbursement for airline expenses for Mr. Steenblik on 
several of his trips between Phoenix and Salt Lake City, expenses incurred by 
John Howe and Bob Howe to attend client conferences, settlement conferences 
and trial, or John Howe's expenses in traveling to Salt Lake City for his 
deposition. (Ld. at 4-5). Furthermore, the copying charges for thousands of 
pages of documents was less than what Manivest charged for copies from its 
files. (R. 1240 at 4.) The Howes did not request reimbursement for the fees 
of expert witnesses who were not allowed to testify (R. 1181 at 2.) 
43 
For example, included in Manivest's list of "Billings without 
sufficient detail" is an entry made by Mr. Steenblik for April 23, 1990. 
(R. 1190 at 12.) That entry reads: "Prepare Response to Valley Bank'6 Motion 
to Intervene; prepare Affidavit and Motion to Strike Valley Bank's affidavits; 
prepare letter to Howes regarding status" (R. 1149 at 20.) This entry clearly 
contains sufficient information to enable one to determine what activities 
were performed and whether they were rendered in connection with the present 
litigation. 
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observations were sufficient evidence for some of its findings.44 
Manivest's contention that it was unnecessary to involve three 
attorneys is incredible, given that Manivest itself employed 
three lawyers in its unsuccessful defense of the case.45 
Moreover, the affidavits submitted by the Howes' attorneys 
provided extensive evidence of the services rendered and the 
experience and expertise of the attorneys.46 
Remarkably, although Manivest objected to the affidavits 
filed, Manivest elected to not submit any evidence of its own. 
Thus, the court's responsibility was simply to determine if the 
evidence submitted was competent. The court concluded the evi-
dence was, and ruled accordingly. 
Findings on matters such as the litigation strategy and tactics, 
the difficulty of the litigation, the novelty of the questions, and the amount 
in controversy can be made by the trial judge based on his own observations of 
the judicial proceedings. Sulphur Export Corp. v. Cambean Clipper Lines, 
Inc., 277 F. Supp. 632, 635 n.3 (E.D. La, 1968); Associates Discount Corp. v. 
Tobb Co., 50 Cal. Rptr. 738, 746 (Cal. App. 1960). 
The affidavits submitted in support of the Howes' application 
adequately explained the division of responsibility among the three attorneys 
(R. 1240, I 3; R. 1245, fl 3), and reflected that in some instances when two 
attorneys were involved, the time of one of them was not included in the fee 
request. (R. 1240, f 4). Involving more than one attorney in a trial does 
not automatically render their services duplicative. White v. City of 
Richmond, 713 F.2d 458, 461 (9th Cir. 1983). Manivest's brief alleges nothing 
more. Manivest itself noted that its three-attorney team had "the same 
approximate level of involvement and litigation experience'* as the Howes' 
attorneys. (R. 1190 at 23). 
46 
Manivest's contention that the affidavits contained little 
"admissible evidence" overlooks the fact that all affidavits were based on the 
affiant's personal knowledge after reviewing the relevant records. Affidavits 
of this type are routinely used in fee requests. Manivest's suggestion that 
the trial court was required to ignore the attorneys' sworn statements 
concerning the amount of time spent because the actual records were not 
submitted similarly has no merit in light of current practice. Manivest did 
not even seek access to the actual records. 
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Finally, Manivest is unable to cite a single case, rule, 
statute or other legal precedent to support its contention that 
attorneys' fees are not recoverable if some of the services are 
performed by the husband of one of the parties.4 
The evidence submitted was credible and complete. The trial 
court's findings are not clearly erroneous and must be sustained. 
The Howes respectfully urge this court to affirm the Supple-
mental Judgment and also to award the Howes their costs, expenses 
and reasonable attorneys1 fees incurred on appeal. 
IX. 
MANIVEST*S FAILURE TO MAINTAIN THE IMPROVE-
MENTS VIOLATED THE LEASE. 
The Howes l e a s e ^ ^ h e i r p r o p e r t y : u r s u a n t t o a " n e t l e a s e " 
w i t h t h e u n d e r s t a n d : : . t h a t i t would be u t i l i z e d f o r d e v e l o p m e n t 
a s a s h o p p i n g c e n t e r . The Howes a l l e g e d t h a t t h e L e a s e imposed 
upon t h e t e n a n t t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o m a i n t e : - . t h e s h o p p i n g 
c e n t e r improvements ana t h a t Man ives t f a i l e c t o p e r f o r m t h i s 
o b l i g a t i o n . 
P r i o r t o t r i a l , t h e Howes s o u g h t c l e a r a n c e f o r t h e i r e x p e r t s 
t o i n s p e c t t h e s h o p p i n g c e n t e r . A f t e r f i l i n g a m o t i o n f o r 
The c o n t e n t i o n t h a t f e e s cannot be a l lowed in t h e absence of a 
showing t h a t t h e f e e s were a c t u a l l y incurred or have been charged was r e j e c t e d 
by t h i s cour t long ago . Utah Nat iona l Bank v . N e l s o n , 111 P. 907 , 918 (Utah 
1 9 1 0 ) ; McCornick v . Swem, 102 P. 626, 629 (Utah 1 9 0 9 ) , Modern c o u r t s have 
c o n t i n u e d t o r e j e c t i t . S e e , e . g . , Thompson v . Madison County Board of 
Educat ion , 496 F.2d 682 , 689 (5th C i r . 1974) ( " a t t o r n e y s f e e s and e x p e n s e s may 
not be reduced . . . because t h e a t t o r n e y does not e x a c t a f e e M ) . A c o n t r a r y 
r u l i n g would r e s u l t in a w i n d f a l l t o t h e d e f a u l t i n g party and prevent t h e 
recovery of a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s in any c a s e performed on c o n t i n g e n c y b a s i s . Far 
from reap ing a w i n d f a l l , Mr. S t e e n b l i k ' s f e e was c a l c u l a t e d at $25 t o $57 an 
hour l e s s than h i s normal r a t e . (R. 1149 at 2 , 4 . ) 
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access, the Howes' experts were allowed to make an inspection. 
The experts formed certain conclusions regarding the lack of 
maintenance. According to the Howe's proffer of proof, Mr. Judge 
Hawkes, a roofing expert, concluded the roof had not been 
maintained to industry standards and that roof repairs would cost 
at least $150,000. (Tr. 226.) Mr. Hawkes' other findings are in 
proffered exhibit 41. The Howes also proffered that Rex Frazier, 
a shopping center expert, would testify as to industry standards 
of maintenance and that the shopping center was not maintained to 
industry standards. (Tr. 229.) Manivest admitted that the 
parking lot needed to be replaced at a cost of over $200,000. 
(Tr. 361.) 
The Howe's proffered that James P. Cowley, a Salt Lake 
lawyer who represented the tenant in negotiation of the Lease 
would testify that the scope of the maintenance obligation of the 
tenant included the improvements. (Tr. 230.) Manivest argued 
that such evidence was irrelevant because the Lease imposed no 
maintenance obligation on the tenant except to control the weeds. 
The trial court ruled that the Lease was not ambiguous and that 
Manivest had no obligation to maintain the improvements. (Tr. 
190.) This ruling precluded the consideration of evidence of 
substantial additional breaches by Manivest. 
Paragraph 5 of the Lease provides in pertinent part: 
5. Lessee agrees to be responsible for the 
entire demised premises, and during the term of the 
lease to maintain the same and keep it free from weeds 
and other obnoxious growth; . . . 
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The remaining portion of paragraph 5 required compliance 
with laws and ordinances, and, in order to enforce their rights, 
paragraph 7 of the Lease gave the Howes the right to inspect the 
improvements• 
The question then is whether the first clause of paragraph 5 
of the Lease is merely a covenant to keep the land free and clear 
of weeds and other obnoxious growth or whether it includes both a 
covenant to "maintain" as well as a covenant to keep the premises 
free from weeds and other obnoxious growth. Is the word "and" 
used in the conjunctive to designate two separate obligations or 
to link concepts that mean the same thing, thus making the first 
one illusory and redundant? The Howes submit that it does state 
a covenant to maintr. ^  .. .j that, when viewed in context, the 
obligation induce - -4 -? -r:pping center improvements. 
Analysis of . ~ .• . . .-rt.ion requires consideration of 
relationship of tv:* pu::.ies, In this case, that relationship was 
governed by a "net least. ' During the trial, Mr. Leeper, testi-
fied unequivocally that : Lease was an "entirely net lease." 
(Tr. 316, 1. 1-10.) He lather agreed that this meant that 
Manivest was obliged i: pay "any taxes or insurance costs or 
anything associa-. v. with tne operation of that center." Ld. at 
315, 1. 22-25. (Emphasis added.) 
According to Friedman: 
Under the terms of a long-term net lease, it is 
customary for a tenant to undertake to make all 
necessary repairs and replacements, to comply with all 
relevant lav;s, whether or not those involve structural 
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changes or replacements, and to restore, replace or 
reconstruct after damage by fire or other causes. 
Friedman § 10.301A at p. 543. (Emphasis added.) Moreover a 
covenant to "maintain" is an independent covenant separate and 
distinct from a covenant to keep property free from weeds and 
other obnoxious growth. "A covenant to 'maintain1 is a covenant 
to repair." 1 M. Friedman, On Leases, § 7.301 (1983). Friedman 
further states: 
A net lease presumes the landlord will receive a fixed 
rent, without deduction for repairs, taxes, insurance, 
or any other charges, other than landlord's income 
taxes. Accordingly, the repair clause requires tenant 
to make all repairs, inside and out, structural and 
otherwise, as well as all necessary replacements of the 
improvements on the premises (and to comply with all 
legal requirements affecting these improvements during 
the term). A lease is not "net" as this term is used 
in long-term leases, if the tenant's repair obligations 
are less than these. (Emphasis added.) 
The Howes' respectfully urge that the trial court erred when 
it concluded that the Lease did not impose an obligation on 
Manivest to maintain the shopping center improvements. However, 
in the event the Trial Court's judgment is affirmed, it is not 
necessary to rule on the merits of this cross-appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
It is well settled that a party which invokes equity to 
prevent a forfeiture, must demonstrate that it comes with clean 
hands. Equity does not protect one who has been unfair or who 
has not exercised reasonable diligence to perform its obliga-
tions. Willful and persistent defaults will not be countenanced 
by a court of equity. 
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After considering all of the evidence and the credibility 
of the witnesses, the trial court concluded that Manivest had 
repeatedly violated of the Lease. The trial court concluded that 
Manivest should not ask the court to do what Manivest could have 
done for itself. That ruling should not be disturbed on appeal. 
DATED this 16th day of May, 1991. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By ^L^U /^ -*"v^uC"CL. 
By 
Michael R. Carlston 
L^Ux_ 
Max D. Wheeler 
JENNINGS, STROUSS & SALMON 
,\^ ~ <fc.*^i>X_ 
Gerrit M. Steenblik 
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is so. Jo /Qa&wfjif— JJCT
 3 j * 1 9 6 0 
Ecor. 1754wr25w^ta' 
"Wqi^est of .. 
1744315 fgAsp Ayp 9m9?? ' J tep order, Salt Like Cour Vy, Ui 
-7. XO
 A ..,. By -2d444****ol rjeput 3Zi^ 
THIS zmaanvu JINK MQ> BTTKUP nrro thia^^v^jday of 
October,. 1K0, by and between BAU 1 . W«l and VXVXAV K»(B, hie 
wife, and jos» 0* WW and MAXIM B3W, hie wife, of Salt LaXa 
County, Utah, harelnafte* rafarrod to aa Lessors and J« I . L*HBHE** 
SBJtmui X,. fRM» and SXAJtroaD L. BALM, oopartaers, doing bueinaea 
under tha f i n M M and atyia of VKUMt •mtiim c o m a , baraln* 
aftar rafarrad to aa tha Leeeaee* 
KllKllLllft 
That tha Lessors* for and in consideration of tha cava-
nanti and agreements herelnafta? aantlonad to ba kapt* paid and 
performed by tha Lessees, haa daaleed and laaMd to tha Lessaes 
that eartaln raal aatata aituatad in Hurray, Salt Lafca County, 





ll 1 & 
Cooneaclng at a point 12 rode Wait and 14 rod* Worth 
fro* tha Southeast eomar of tha aorthwest quartar of 
faction 17, Township 2 South, Range 1 laat , Salt Lake 
Meridian, and running thanca North M koda, sora or 
laas, to tha Vorth l i M of tha South half of aaid 
Northwest quartari thanoa Watt along aaid Vorth l ine 
9is faat, aore or l e s s , to tha Northeast corner of 
precises described in deed racorded ae Intry Wo. 3260*8, 
Official Record*i thanca South 1° 02* Heat 187*0 feet, 
mora or leee, to the Boutheeet corner of eaid pre&ieest 
thanca vest along tha Southerly boundary of eaid 
praalaee 226 faet, more or leee, to the Southweit 
corner thereof, thence onward West 321.75 faet, more 
or l e s s , to the northwesterly corner of a parcel of 
land described in deed recorded ee Entry Ho. 165237, 
Official Recordsi thence following the exterior 
boundaries of a par^l of l*nrt described in eaid deed „ 
South 19 rodsi thence South 27° 45* East >f.7 rods> ° 
thence South 50° 05* East.11.2 rods'; thence South 4.5 
rods, more or l e s s , to the South l ine of eaid Northwest 
quarter; thence East along the South l ine of eaid 
northwest quarter to a point on the Northerly l ine of 
Vine Street; thence North 46° 43* 30" las t 71.5 feet; 
thence East 189 feet; thence South 300 feet to tho 
center of Vine Street; thence South 51° 24* East along 
the center of Vine Street to a point 4.5 chains Kest 
and South 2° East from the Northeast corner of the 
Northwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of said 




ggS^*"- taut* U M of said aartbvtst quartarjYtbanoa fertb; 
^^-tr-jr^ld rods* tbanco^ast 4#*3 rods, roro o x l i M ^ . f
 v, . 
SS^^vX. tbo point Qf fcogUxning, with 2S sbaraa of tba*«pital£*; 
JJtb day of Qctobor, 1**Q, to tbo l i tb day of Oetobox, 3010•->-/, 
^yfv^r
 x 1# Tbo bossoo oovaaaata and agroos to pay by *ay of son 
for'aald property tbo following aMootoi Firat yoar, $7*100,00* 
c ^ S " 4t^ <




' '<• V % v V '
 s ' . . . ' - " • *-*$ + '&' :!>S* 
*ooslpt of *biob i t boroby aofcooitlodgodf ' ioooad yoar** $7,»00#00, 
^ ^ - ^ % , n * ^ ^ v ( *.>*, * - ^t , - « >_ * ; • > , " % * . V . ^ \ 
payabla O M (X) yoarfroa datai TUixd yoar, #13,000.00i and aacb 
yoar tbaraaftar during tbo t o n of tbla laaso*' #a4,000«OG par yoar 
Tba rantals provided baroia payabla aftor tbo firat yoar shall bo 
~^<J * * * < *« * \ •. *? > t\ *"* 
«Srt£ ^paid in oquai poatbly lastaUaaat* oa tbo first day of Sovoabor-
y~-«* - \ '.\ • - - ' - ^ \ > k. * -*V 
and tbo first day of oaeb and'ovary aoatb tboroaftor during tbo* 
torn of tbis Loaao* 
2. fcsssoos shall, in additioa to tbo root horainboforo 
rosarvod, pay all of tbo roal ostato ta*os, opoelal laprova—at , 
Ataxosf ar^sr tuts and all otbor taxo* loviad upon tbo abovo 4o~ 
^ooribod proporty* aad any laprovonants vbidh Pay bo plaood tboroon 
'togothor yitb all vator rants, «as bills, oo^ar ohargos aad ail
 a 
, £tbar cbargos for oorviooa or utllitioa rondsrod to tbo Loisass or 
aay*toaaats of tbo t«oasoos aituatod upon tba rlsalssd proaioaStJ; 
^ y 1. It is agrood botwoon tbo part las baroto tbat tbo^/ 
Llioaaooa. contopplats to and pursuant to tbis Laaso ftgrooopft tbo 
eoastruetloo of a rogioaal shopping oantor oo tbo dsniood proaioos 
:^ bitfi ahali.^oootoaplato tbo laotailatioa of utUitUs upon tbo ds-
miaod proaloos oo as to oorvo a U parts tharoof, tbo ooaistmction 
+%'?** * -*--'»£ -•'- c > » ^ ^  " • .*•*' -v . * 
of buildings and otbor iapro/ssisiitson aaid proaiaas, aad tbs pub-
loasiag of tba as»s.* All Uqnrovspaota plaeod upon^aaid dsniaod^ 
liik1-' \<^ *»*<- v%-^*-^ ,, ^  ^  .- ^ ^^ 4 */^  k ^  
sball roaain tbo proporty of tbo Lossaas ao long as tbis 
•a-
UWO*rKIIOr 
MorrAT lvtir«oM AND C L O S M I N 
• u " t • a t m * »*•<» *w « * • 
•AA.T UkJCt CTTT 11 UTAH 
v. 4754 £•: 27 
Lease remains in full force and effect* j 
i; ! 
jj 4. Lessees shall have the right to assign this Lease 
| and Option to purchase to a corporation to be fanned for the pixr- j 
I; I 
;: pose of carrying out the terms of this Agreement. Such assignment 
;' 6hall not release the Lessee of any liabilities hereunder. Except 
II i 
|| as to the assignment permitted pursuant t o t h i s paragraph, t h i s j 
j M . tfx.ll b . t u u M i g n * ! . ~ e . p t with t h .
 P r i « c o n - n t of the | 
•j Lessors . Provided, however, that the Lessees or the i r assignee J 
Assignment'! j 
j f Lease . as herein provided sha l l have the r ight to enter Into subleases of 
and sub- j 
leas ing portions of the demised premises, provided, however, that sa id 
subleases sha l l not attach to or become binding In any way upon ! 
i 
the fee i n t e r e s t of the Lessors; that said Lessees s h a l l be U n i t e d 
to that c l a s s of business cotaoonly Known of as "re ta i l trade and 
s e r v i c e 0 . 
I 
5. Lessee agrees to be responsible for the entire de- j 
mised premises* and during the term of the lease to maintain the 
ease and keep i t free from weeds and other obnoxious growth; that 
Maintenance 
of i t w i l l not allow any of i t s l e s s e e s to conduct any business or 
premises 
perform any act in v i o l a t i o n of the ordinances orregulatlons of 
Kurrary City, the laws of the State of Utah or the United Sta tes 
Government. 
6. Lessee agrees to keep the demised premises free and 
Liens c lear of a l l l i e n s and encumbrances of any nature whatsoever, ex -
cept as to those Hens created pursuant to Paragraph 14 hereof. 
7. The Lessors sha l l have the right at a l l reasonable 
Inspec-
t ion times to Inspect the demised premises and any and a l l improvements 
placed thereon. 
8. I t i s covenanted and agreed between the part ies 
Landlord's 
l i en hereto that the Lessor does net by anything herein contained waive 
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any r ights under and pursuant to the landlord's l i e n lav as pro-
i 
vlded by the s t a t u t e s of the State of Utah* ( 
! 
9. Should lessees fail to pay the rent herein reserved 
! 
or cake any of the other payments or charges to be paid by the?? ! 
i 
hereunder or fail tc keep any covenant herein contained to be per-
formed by Lessee, or within sixty (60) days thereafter, then in j 
that event, without notice from the Lessors, this Agreement shall ; 
I! I 
cease and terminate, and the Lessees shall surrender said premises 
! I 
to the Lessors . 
10. I f the Leasees sha l l abandon or vacate said premisea 
or, for cause, be rcsaoved therefrcB, the sazoe may be r e - l e t by the 
I 
Lessor for such rent and on such terns as the Lesser say reasonably 
l e s s e e ' s ! 
l i a b i l i t y obtain, and i f a s u f f i c i e n t sua sha l l not be thus rea l i zed to s a - I 
default t i s f y the minixsus rent hereby reserved, the Lessees agree to pay j 
and s a t i s f y a l l d e f i c i e n c i e s , 
11 . I f Lessees s h a l l make or at teept to sake an a s s i g n -
Dent for the benef i t of c red i tors , or i f a p e t i t i o n for voluntary 
or involuntary bankruptcy i s f i l e d against or on behalf of Lessees, 
tr*e Lessor Day terminate t h i s Le»se and an axsount equal to the 
.-.csignsent 
for credi.- t o t a l of the otnimuro nonthly rental for each and every acntn then 
tors and 
bankruptcy regaining in the term of t h i s lease s h a l l immediately be c o w due 
and payable, l e s s such sua as Lessor nay be able to r e a l i z e by re* 
renting the premises for such rent and on such terae as Lessor may 
see f i t . 
12 . This Agreement s k a l l not be v o d l i l s d or changed e x -
changee 
cept by the written agreement of the par t i e s hereto . 
13. This Agreement sha l l inure to the benef i t of and 
. leirs an£ be binding upon the heirs* successors , personal representat ives , 
successors 
administrators, and ass igns of the part ies hereto . 














14. The Lessors agree that upon the Lessees supplying 
i 
then with a duplicate original lease between the Lessees and some 
tenant qualified by the tenn6 of this Agreeoent to becooe a sub- ! 
j 
lessee and providing the Lessors with full information concerning • 
the terns and conditions of the proposed mortgage and the construe-
j 
tion agreement providing for the application of the proceeds of 
i 
t 
the sase, the Lessors will subordinate their interest in the land 
upon which the improvement is to be made to a single first oortgage 
of such reasonable asou.nt as cay be necessary to finance the con-
straction of the improvement* called for by said Lease Agreement• 
Sold subordination shall be executed by tne Lessors conveying said 
i 
property to the Lessee or sub-lessee as the cs&e say be, who shall 
cause a first mortgage to be placed thereon and to reconvoy said i 
| 
property to the Lessor without any assumption by the Lessor of the 
! 
obl igat ion to pay any sua due or to becone due by reason of sa id 
rortgags . j 
15. The Lessees are hereby given an Option to buy any j 
or a l l of the demised pres iaes upon the following tersjs and con-
d i t ions : j 
The purchase price for the f i r s t twelve (12) ocnths f o l -
lowing the execution of t h i s Agreement sha l l be $366,000.00, sa id 
purchase price sha l l be increased upon the f i r s t anniversary of i 
t h i s Agreement by the SUB of $20.00 pez acre for each acre then 
covered by t h i s Lease, and upon each and every anniversary of t h i s 
Agreement for the f i r s t f ive years by a li^m aoount, and thereafter 
i t sha l l be increased $100.00 per acre, for each acre then covered 
by t h i s Lease, p^x year. 
16. The Option herein granted sha l l be exercised by the 
Lessees giving notice in writing to the Lessors of the ir exerc i se 
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of this Option, describing therein the tract of land so acquired, 
and offering to pay the purchase price as herein provided, upon 
receiving a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying said land 
to the Lessee. 
The Option hereby granted shall provide to the whole of 
the said tract of land and to a ten-acre portion thereof, and 
after said ten-acre portion or sore shall have teen purchased by 
the Lessee, to any other three-acre or larger tracts* Should the 
Lessee exercise option to purchase a ten-acre tract or larger, but 
less than the whole hereof, the purchase price shall be the pro-
rata share of the total purchase price as herein provided for, 
plus 110,000.00. The subsequent tracts of land shall be at the 
prorata acreage price hereinbefore provided, provided however that 
the total purchase price shall not be DO re than the total purchase 
price as herein provided. 
17. Any tract so purchased shall be designated by the 
Lessee; it shall be contiguous with itself and any tracts thereto-
fore purchased by the Lessee; it shall have four sides, i.e., a 
street side, two side lines at right angles to the street, and 
a straight rear line 7 and the street frontage shall be in the saxoe 
proportion to the total street frontage that the area bears to the 
total area. 
18. This Option shall endure for fifteen (15) years from 
date hereof. The exercise of the right of the Lessee to purchase 
less than the whole hereof shall effect a prorata reduction in the 
rental payable hereunder, after the payment of the purchase price 
as herein provided. 
19. The Lessor shall furnish the Lessee, upon desand, 
a good and sufficient abstract of title certified to as of the 
date of this Agreement, or any. ^datje .subsequent thereto, and the 
£.1754 ni 31 
obligation of the Lessors shall ba lii&ited to delivering a good 
and marketable title aa of the date of this Agreement* Laaaora 
'; covenant not to encuober the title to said property* 
II 
it 
I: 20. The Lessors and Lessees each agree that should they 
!l i 
;• default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, ; 
i the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a 
! reasonable attorney*a fee, which nay arise or accrue £ro;j enforc- | 
Cost and 
attorney's ing this Agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises 
fees 
covered hereby! or in pursuing any reoedy provided hereunder or by 
the statutes of the State of Utah whether such reoedy is pursued 
by filing a suit or otherwise. 
21* «\s herein used, the singular number includes the 
'•uaber and 
gender plural and the siascuJLine gender Includes the feminine and the 
neuter* 
22c The Lessee covenants and agrees to ciriimwni n conetrnq*^ 
tion of the shopping center herein contemplated within -*^ ?-f ^ / 
days of the date of this Agreement, and to thereafter diligently 
Czrszencc 
construe- proceed with the development and construction of said shopping 
tion 
center. 
23. Tise is of the essence of this Agreement, including 
the provisions of Paragraph 22. Performance of the conditions of 
Tore© 
majeure Paragraph 22, however, shju.1 be excused by etrifcss, accidents, acts 
of God, weather conditions and other causes of nonperformance be-
yond the control of the Lessee. 
24. Heal estate taxes for the year I960 shall be pro-
1960 
Taxes rated as of the date of this A*reepent• 
IS WIT! 5?5 "HEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this 
-7-
r rl754 '..- 3? 
Agreewnt to !>• execute! tb« <5«y and y»*r *ir»t above written. 
,^V 7< ,^4Y/ 
/ . ^ 
LESSORS 
?•<. I..-?*~ z^-^-rr /., 
-z£4 
DcLna bus iness aBt 
LTSSI 
6TAT1 Of OTAa ) 
) • » . 
COOTT* OF SALT LAKE ) 
On t h i s j ^ ^ d s y of October, 1960, personal ly appeared 
before n EARL B. H7W and VTVXAH as*E, h i* w i l e , end JOfXN o . 
end MAXXSE EKME, h ie wife , who, being f i r e t Ally sworn, actoowledgad 
to » that they execxxtetf the foregoing Lei 
icy C remission Expires* H Botary tafe&irf ^ , 
(tfft'f hiding ^J^f^L^ 
•TAW or xrr*a ) 
) se. 
cowry or SALT LAKE ) 
° * th i s - /4r dev of October, I960* pereoael ly appeared 
b e f o r e a« J . 8 . XJESSSOCK, BEKKAM L . FRAIOC end STASTORD L . HALE, 
who, being f i r e t dely sworn, acknowledged to M thet they execrated 
the tereeoinf Lease sad Option ee Leeeees . . 
My Coamlsi • loo Expires: 
! • « • -. . ^ £ -.,«> 
Tab 3 
esc 5 t =" C e - - r - ' 
p; c - A = r- es K E S . - : 
5 ^ r » K. A % M M . e = •: 
P < C — * c ~ ~ c * c - % « 
L A v\ C r r ' C E S 
N l ' S L E N A N D > J o C K 
l O C O C O N T I N E N T A L B A N " E W , _ C '• 
SALT LAKE C I T Y . 1'TAII B M O J 
U:[c^os[ eC' 359 ?77i 
September 8, 1969 
Mr. D. Howe Moffat 
Attorney at Law 
Moffat, Iverson & Taylor 
Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Howe: 
Pursuant to your request, we wish to advise you of the following equity 
interest owned by South Lake Shopping Center, Inc. in the South Lake 
Shopping Center properties: 
LENDER 
Continental Assurance Co. 
Prudential Federal Savings 
Prudential Federal Savings 
Pru fer.tial Federal Savings 




12 AS/6 6 
2/2 8/6 4 
12/31/66 
AMOUNT BALANCE 
$ 55,000.00 S 32,124.67 
$720,000.00 
$ 26,000.00 $649,350.15 
$ 88,000.00 
$ 17,500.00 $ 57,258.85 
TOTAL $906,500.00 5738,733.6^ 
O^r client has a net equity in the property, based on original loan values. 
of S1G7,76C.33. This net equity value does not include any increase in 
the value of the property since 1961, nor does it include any value in 
the unimproved property at the rear of the shopping center. 
Very truly yours, 
NESLEN AND MOCK 
LA^\ C r f " ' C E £ 
J A R D I N E , B A L D W I N . P R U I T T A N D BROV~N 
C E - - " « ' - *- 9 C C E ~ CA £ C N A~ c6* A ... G A £ E w " w ^ ' N G 
E = : . ' ,N S A L T L A K E C I T Y , U T A H 84111 
f E . E P - C s E <£C » 3 2 6 - e 7 
J u l y 2 2 , 1 9 7 1 
Mr. E a r l E. Hove 
357 0 Oakwood 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Mr. John 0. Howe 
9^ 2 East 5600 South 
Murray, Utah 
Gentlemen: 
As I advised you a few weeks ago, the shareholders of South Lake 
Shopping Center are going to sell all of the issued and outstand-
ing stock of the corporation to National Realty, Ltd., a Limited 
Partnership, organized by Ernest C. Psarras, of which Sam \\. 
Souvall, J. E. Lehnherr, Herman L. Franks, and some of the other 
selling shareholders are partners. 
In order to pay for substantial remodeling costs and in order to 
purchase rental guaranty insurance on the Peck & Shaw lease, it 
has been necessary for South Lake to make application to Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan Association for a mortgage loan in the 
amount of 5852,000.00 repayable over a twenty year (20) period 
bearing interest at the rate of 8]u:: per annum. The loan will be 
guaranteed by Lehnherr, Franks, Hale, Price, Carpenter, Sam. \\. 
Souvall, and George \\. Souvall, and their wives, even though 
these individuals will no longer be shareholders of South Lake. 
A preliminary title report has been ordered and the loan should 
be in a position to close within the next two weeks. 
The proceeds of the $852,000.00 loan will be used as follows: 
1. To pay balance of existing loan to Prudential - $638,922.00 
2. To pay unsecured loan to Valley Bank & Trust 
for funds borrowed to complete the Peck & 
Shaw premises and the Elaine Powers Health 
Studio premises 110,000.00 
3. To pay costs incurred in finishing and 













Julv 22, 1971 
U. To pay the single policy premium for rental 
guarantee insurance for 180 months on Peck 
& Shaw lease 
5. For operating capital for closing costs, 






Your cooperation in subordinating your title to the new Prudential 
loan will be very much appreciated. In accordance with the pro-
visions of your lease agreement, our client would also appreciate 
your consenting to the assignment of your Lease and Option by the 
South Lake Shopping Center to National Realty, Ltd., which will 
occur at the time National Realty, Ltd., as the sole shareholder 
of South Lake, dissolves and liquidates the corporation. The 
assignment to the limited partnership will in no way affect the 
liability of Lehnherr, Franks and Hale as the original lessees of 
the lease and option, nor affect the personal guarantees of the 
various shareholders of South Lake who have individually guaran-
teed the obligations of the lessees under the subject agreement. 
If you have any questions concerning these matters, or if you 
desire a meeting with the principal selling shareholders to 
discuss the overall transaction, please let us know. 
Very truly yours, 
Jaldw'in 
!\ u ~> . J ~ 
cc : Sam V,'. Souvall 
J. E. Lehnherr 
Ernest C. Psarras 
i - i > \ C r r C L S 
J A R D I N E . B A L D W I N , P R V I T T A N D B R O W N 
9 C C E _ C ^ £ C N , £ - W C £ . _ G A S E w »_ Z "^  G 
SALT LAKE C I T Y . UTAH 841 u 
September 2, 1971 
Mr. D. Howe Moffatt 
Attorney at Law 
Tribune Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Howe: 
In my letter to John and Earl Howe of July 22, 1971, in which I 
listed capital expenditures to be made out of the $852,000.00 
South Lake loan, I failed to include the following items: 
1. New air-conditioning system for Peck & Shaw 
and Fashion Fabrics required by reason of 
dividing the Thrift City Building $6,500.00 
2. Curb and gutter surrounding Shopping Center 
required by Murray City " 8,700.00 
5. Service fee ar.z attorneys fee charged by 
Fruder.tial " " 4,940.00 
4. Title insurance 2,189.00 
c _ cr c _ 
:ee 825.00 
TOTAL S25,154.00 
The above iters together with the items in my letter of July 22, 
total $814,312.00 leaving only $37,748.00 rather than $61,022.00 
shown in my letter for operating capital and to pay current accounts 
payable. 
I would very much appreciate your discussing this matter further with 
your clients and if they still express some reluctance to subordinating 
their title, I suggest we meet with the parties to see what we can 
work out. South Lake has made numerous binding commitments based on 
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the availability of this loan and the cooperation of your clients 
would be very much appreciated. 
Very truly yours, 
R0E:mlk 
cc: Sam K. Souvall 
Ernest C. Psarras 
J. E. Lehnherr 
November 2, 1971 
Mr. Earl Howe 
3570 Oakwood 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Larl: 
I am enclosing a statement for services rendered in connection 
witn your negotiations with Soutn LaKe. 
1 his na t te r , 1 thinK, was concluded properly, ana 1 hope to your 
entire sat.siaction. Mucn mere time was spent on it thai 
snould nave been due to the fact that the Soutn LaKe people kept 
coming up witn various and diverse programs, some of wnicn 
seerrca to nave Deen designed to mislead you. In any event, I 
t r . s t \ou will imd tne enclosed in order. 
Sincere!) >ours, 
J. nov\e A.oifat 
Dh.\.:n 
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JARDINE, BALDWIN. PRUITT AND BRO^*N 
. I^£s s E = r.-. SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84 ill 
' E j c - c s r (tc * 326-e " 
July 22, 1971 
Mr. Earl E. Howe 
357 0 Oakwood 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Mr. John 0. Howe 
9-2 East 5600 South 
Murray, Utah 
As I advised you a few weeks ago, the shareholders of South Lake 
Shopping Center are going to sell all of the issued and outstand-
ing stock of the corpcration to National Realty, Ltd., a Lir.ited 
Partnership, organized by Ernest C. Psarras, of which Sar. V*. 
ScuvslI, J. E. Lehnherr, Herman L. Franks, and some of the other 
selling shareholders are partners. 
In order to pay for substantial remodeling costs and in order to 
purchase rental guaranty insurance on the Peck & Shaw lease, it 
has been necessary for South Lake to make applic?ticv . to Prudential 
deccral Savings £ Loan Assc.iation for a mortgag loan in the 
a-iur.t cf 5852,000.00 repayable over a twenty year (20) period 
rearing interest at the rate of 6vh- per annum. The loan will be 
guaranteed by Lehnherr, Franks, Hale, Price, Cart.nter, Semi;. 
Scuvall, ana George V". Souvall, and their wives, even though 
these individuals will no longer be shareholders of South Lake. 
A preliminary title report has been ordered and the loan should 
be in a pcsition to close within the next two weeks. 
The proceeds of the £652,000.00 loan will be used as follows: 
1. To pay balance of existing loan to Prudential - $636,922.00 
2. To pay unsecured loan to Valley Bank & Trust 
for funds borrowed to complete the Peck & 
Shaw premises and the Elaine Powers Health 
tudio premises 110,000.00 ^ 
cos t s incurred in f i n i s h i n g and 









 % 1S71 
To pay the single policy premium for rental 
guarantee insurance for ISO months on Peck 
& Shaw lease 
For operating capital for closing costs, 
























ooperation in subordinating your title to the new Prudential 
ill be very much appreciated. In accordance with the pro-
s of your lease agreement, our client would also appreciate 
consenting to the assignment of your Lease and Option by the 
Lake Shopping Center to National Realty, Ltd., which will 
at the tire National Realty, Ltd., as the sole shareholder 
th Lake, dissolves and liquidates the corporation. The 
rent to the limited partnership will in no way affect the 
ity of Lehnherr, Franks and Hale as the original lessees of 
ase and option, nor affect the personal guarantees of the 
s shareholders of South Lake who have individually guaran-
obligations of the lessees under the subject agreement. 
have any questions concerning these matters, or if you 
a meeting with the principal selling shareholders to 
= the overall transaction, please let us know. 
v^ 
Very truly yours, 
Sa- V.. Sou vail 
J. E. Lehnherr 
Ernest C. Fsarras 
J A K D I N E . BALDWIN, P R V I T T AND BROWN 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y . U T A H 6 4 1 n 
* [ . E C - : S [ i t : i : - £ g - e -
September 2, 1971 
Mr. D. Hov:e Moffatt 
Attorney at Lav: 
Tribune Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
F i p S v U-~7 
In -;• l e t t e r t o John end E a r l Hove of J u l y 22 , 1 9 7 1 , in which I 
l i s t e d c a p i t a l e x p e n d i t u r e s t o be made out of t h e 5 8 5 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Kev: a i r - c o n d i t i o n i n g system fo r Peck £ Shav: 
and Fash ion F a b r i c s r e q u i r e d by r e a s c n of 
d i v i d i n g t h e T h r i f t C i ty B u i l d i n g 5 6 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 
Curl: E : . : c u t t e r s u r r cu r . i i nz Shopping Cen te r 
r e h i r e d b\ .Hurray C i ty ^ * ^ 8 , 7 0 0 . 0 0 
4 , 9 ^ 0 . 0 0 
2 , 1 8 9 . 0 0 
823.00 
TOTAL 5 25 .15 4.00 
The abcve ite-s together vith the items in my letter of July 22, 
total 5814,512.00 leaving only 557,748.00 rather than $61,022.00 
shov:r. in ry letter for operating capital and to pay current accounts 
payable. 
I would very much appreciate your discussing this matter further vith 
your clients and if they still express some reluctance to subordinating 
their title, I suggest ve meet vith the parties to see vhat ve can 
vcrk out. South Lake has made numerous binding commitments based on 
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the a \ c i l a h i l i t \ of t h i s loan and the coopera t ion of \ our c l i e n t s 
vo - l c be very nuch apprec i a t ed . 
Very t r u l y your s , 
R0E:r2k 
cc : Sar \\. Souvall 
Ernest C. Fsa r ras 
J . E. Lehnherr 
November 2, 1971 
Mr. Earl Howe 
3570 Oakwood 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
I am enclosing a statement for services rendered in connection 
witn your negotiations with Soutn Lake. 
I'rus matter, I think, was concluded properly, and 1 hope to your 
entire satisfaction. .wucn more time was spent on :t tnan 
snouid have been due to the fact that the Soutn Lake people kept 
cDrying up witn various and diverse programs, some of which 
seemed to nave been designed to mislead you. In any event, I 
trust you will find tne er.zlosej in order. 
Sincerely yours, 
J. nov.e A.offat 
Tab 8 
PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST, INC. r c r _ 
January 22, 1988 
Mr. and Mrs. Gerrit M. Steenblik 
5501 East Caoelhill Road 
Phoenix, Arizona 85018 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Steenblik: 
Recently, we completed a loan transaction with Valley Bank; 
a:iu m doing so, they have taken an assignment of our leasehold 
lr.terebt at the South Lake Shopping Center. 
V,Te are enclosing two copies of the Assignment of Lease 
v!..;n ha- been executed by us and by the lender. Attached to this 
assignment is an acknowledgement which we would like signed. Would 
\.o
 r2crase sign where your names appear, ha\e your signatures notar-
ized, a^ c return one copy to us in the enclosed self-addressed 
t- " . c 1 re. 
i^ !.: \our rlie, 
.r'. The second copy of the assign-
Sincerely, 
\^  




cc: John Howe 
CAROL H. EVANS 
STATE CF ITAH ) 
COJSTv Cr SALT LA<E ) 
ss. 
JOHN 0. HOWE 
MAX1NE HOWE 
GER-IT M. STEENS.IK 
JUDITH H. STEENBLIK 
Address for notice purposes: 
Valley Bank and Trust 
SO West Broadway • 330 
Salt Lake City, I'tah 8M CI 
On this day of January, 19:8, personally appeared before 
rce, RCrErT E. U'C*'E, tne signer or the above instrument who duly acknow-
lecaec to re tnat ne executed tne sane. 




STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, JOHN 0. HOWE, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, MAXINE HOWE, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknowledged 
to me that she executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY 0- SA.T LAKE ) 
On this day of January, 19S8, personally appeared before 
me, GERRIT M. STEENBLIK, the signer of the above instrument who duly 
acknowledged to me that he execjted the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, JUDITH H. STEE?»ELIK, the signer of the above instrument who duly 
acknowledged to me that she executed the same. 
My Com-ission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
-7- Residing at: 
Tab 10 
WHEN RECORDED KAIL TO: 
Randy Grim*haw, Esq. 
185 South State Street, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
PROFESSIONAL MAKIVEST, INC., TRUSTEE, a corporation organized and 
existing under the lavs of the State of Utah, with its principal office at 
Salt Lake City, Cour-v of Salt Lake, State of Utah, grantor, hereby QUIT 
CLAIMS to WALLABY EKTERPR1ZES, a Utah Limited Partnership, and RAY SPRINGER, 
grantees, of Salt Lake City, Utah, for the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and 
other good and valuable consideration, the following tract of land in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah: 
See Ltgal Description attached hereto as "Exhibit A" and 
made a part hereof. 
This deed is given for the purpose of disclaiming any interest in the 
before-described property, the appearance of which might have existed pursuant 
to the legal description used in a Lease recorded at Book 1754, Page 25, an 
Assign-ment of Lease recorded at Book 1757, Page 113, and a Quit Claim Deed 
recorded at Book 4243, Page 395. 
The grantee accepts this Deed and by so doing acknowledges that the 
improvements located on the property described in "Exhibit A" encroach onto 
the land parcel leased by the grantor. Said encroachments are evidenced by 
that certain survey completed by Robert B. Jones of Bush & Gudgell, Inc. fB 6 
G 3-36117). Said encroachments are unacceptaDle to grantor. 
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that thi& deed and t\ 
transfer represented thereby was duly authorised under a rescldtio^ ouly 
adopted by the board of directors of the grantor dt a lawful meeting duly held 
and attended by a quorum. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused itb corporate name and 6eol to 
be hereunto affixed bv its duly authorized officers this day of 
, 1963. 
he 




STATE OF UTAH ) 
)§ 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the ; j day of „ ^ ** , _, 19b3, personally appeared before me 
Larry K. Leeper and Walter B. Collett who, being by me duly sworn, did say, 
each for himself, that he, the said Larry K. Leeper, is the Vice President and 
Walter B. Collett is the secretary of Professional Manivest, Inc., and that 
the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation 
by authority of a resolution of its board of directors; and said Larry K. 
Leeper and Walter B. Collett each duly acknowledged to me that said 
corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed is the seal of said 
corporation. 
Notary Public 
My commisssion expires v " '- Residing in
 v 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of 900 East 
Street, said point being South 89 5b1 27" Ea*t along the center 
section line 379.69 feet and North 0 14' 30" East 30.95 feet from 
the Southwest corner of the Southeast quarter of the Northwest 
quarter of Section 17, Township 2 South, Kan^i- 1 East, Salt- Lake 
li.is>u anil Meridian, and i>aid (joint of begum my, i& also Norxh 
0° 14' 30" Last 31.00 feet and West 53.00 feet from a County 
Monument on the South line of the Northwest quarter of said 
Section 17, and running thence West 630.30 feet; thence North 
2° 00* West 110*9 feet; thence North 86° 15' West 34.48 feet; 
thence North 2 50' West 221.14 feet; thence East 677.00 feet 
to the West right-of-way line of 900 East street; thence South 
0 14' 30" West along said West line 234.60 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
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ASSI6KKENT OF LEASES 
LESSOR'S IKTEREST 
In consideration of the covenants and conditions hereinafter 
contained, this Assignment is made by and between PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST, 
INC., a Utah corporation ("Borrower" hereafter) and VALLEY BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation ("Bank" hereafter), which parties agree as 
follows: 
1. Borrower, for valuable consideration in hand received and as 
security for all indebtedness owing to Bank, does hereby sell, assign, and 
transfer unto Bank all of the Borrower's right, title and interest in and 
to that certain Leases described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto, a copy of 
which Leases are attached hereto as Exhibit "B." This Assignment includes 
all extensions, renewals, modifications or replacements of said Leases, and 
together with any and all guarantees of the obligations of the Lessee 
thereunder and all extensions and renewals of said guarantees. The Leases, 
together with any and all guarantees, modifications, extensions and 
renewals thereof is hereinafter referred to as the "Leases." 
2. The Borrower represents and warrants that Borrower is the 
present Lessor of the Leases described on Exhibit "A" and further warrants 
to Bank as follows: 
A. That the Leases are in full force and effect. 
B. That no default exists on the part of the Lessee there-
under. 
C. That no rent has been collected in advance. 
D. That neither the Leases nor any interest therein has been 
previously assigned or pledged. 
E. That Lessee has no defense, setoff or counterclaim against 
Borrower. 
F. That all rent to date under the Leases have been collected 
and no concession has been granted to Lessee in the form of a 
waiver, release, discount or other alteration of rent due or to 
become due. 
3. Borrower shall furnish evidence of property and casualty 
insurance insuring the improvements constructed on the property described 
in Exhibit "B" and the policy shall be in an amount and form and written by 
such companies as shall be satisfactory to Bank. 
4. Borrower agrees not to transfer or convey fee title to the 
leased premises to Lessee without the prior written consent of Bank. 
5. Borrower shall not terminate the Leases (except pursuant to 
the terms of the Leases upon a default by the Lessee), or modify or amend 
the Leases or any of the terms thereof, or grant any concessions in 
connection therewith without the prior written consent of Bank. 
6. Borrower shall not collect any rents and profits in advance of 
the date on which they become due under the terms of the Leases. 
7. Borrower shall not create or permit any additional liens, 
encumbrances, or interest to attach to the Borrower's interest in the 
Leases. Bank may pay or advance any amounts necessary to preserve and 
protect the Leases and any such payments or advances may be added to the 
indebtedness owing to Bank by Borrower. 
8. The Borrower shall faithfully perform and discharge all 
obligations of the Lessor under the Leases and shall give written notice to 
Bank of any notice of Borrower's default received from Lessee. The 
Borrower shall enforce the Leases and all remedies available to Borrower 
against the Lessee in case of default under the Leases by the Lessee. 
9. Borrower shall give Bank written notice immediately upon 
entering into any new Leases or other occupancy agreement pertaining to the 
real property described in the deed of trust executed coincidentally 
herewith, and shall promptly provide to Bank a true and correct copy of the 
executed Leases or other occupancy agreement. 
10. Borrower shall manage the property through its own personnel. 
11. Borrower shall deliver to Bank, upon Bank's request, a duly 
executed estoppel certificate from the Lessee as required by Bank attesting 
that the Leases are in full force and effect with no defaults thereunder on 
the part of any party, that no rental has been paid in advance, and that 
the Lessee claims no defense or offset against the full and timely perfor-
mance of its obligations under the Leases. 
12. Nothing herein shall be construed to impose any liability or 
obligation on Bank under or with respect to the Leases. Borrower agrees to 
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indemnify and hold Bank harmless from and against any and all liabilities, 
losses and damages which Bank may incur under the Leases or by reason of 
this assignment. 
13. In the event of default in any obligation owing by Borrower 
to Bank, the Bank shall have the following rights: 
A. Bank shall have the right to collect and apply any of the 
rents and profits to the outstanding obligations of Borrower, as 
well as to charges for taxes, Insurance, Improvements, maintenance 
and other items relating to the operation of the property. 
B. Bank shall have the right to take possession of the 
property, manage and operate the property and to take possession 
of and use all books of account and financial records of Borrower 
and its property managers. 
C. Bank shall have the right to execute new lease of any part 
of the property described in the deed of trust executed coinci-
dentally herewith. 
D. Bank shall have the right to cancel or alter any existing 
Leases. 
All of the foregoing rights are cumulative, and Bank shall also have such 
other rights and remedies provided in the promissory note, loan agreement 
or deed of trust executed coincidentally with this agreement. 
14. This Assignment is intended to supplement and not be in 
substitution for any assignment of rents contained in the deed of trust or 
in any other document. Failure of Bank to avail itself of any terms, 
covenants or conditions of this Assignment for any period of time or for 
any reason shall not constitute a waiver thereof. 
15. This Assignment shall remain in full force and effect until 
Borrower's obligations secured hereby have been paid in full. 
16. This Assignment contains the entire agreement between the 
parties and shall not be changed or terminated except by a written amend-
ment signed by the parties hereto. 
17. This Assignment shall be governed under the laws of the State 
of Utah and :-,all inure to the benefit of the parties hereto, their 
successors and assigns. 
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18. All notices given hereunder shall be in writing and shall be 
personally served or sent by first class, or certified U.S. mail, postage 
pre-paid, addressed to the parties as follows: 
BORROWER: 
Professional Manivest, Inc. 
255 East 400 South #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
BANK: 
Valley Bank and Trust Company 
Northern Region Commercial Loan Center 
80 West Broadway 
Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
ATTENTION: Randy Cameron 
19. This Assignment shall be governed under the laws of the State 
of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto being duly authorized have 
executed the above and foregoing Assignment of Leases as of this ^h day 
of Jo^uory, 4486% '**—^ 
BORROWER: BANK: 
PROFESSIONAL MAMVEST, INC., 
a Utah corporation 
By: y ^Z... - Q-dL* <^^-
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation 
-4-
EXHIBIT "A* TO ASSIGNMENT OF LEASES 
SCHEDULE OF LEASES 
1. Date of Lease: June 16, 1986 
Name of Lessee: The Fabric Shop 
Lessee's Address: 5650 South 900 East, Murray, Utah 84107 
Monthly Base Rent: $3,350 
2. Date of Lease: September 30, 1983 
Name of Lessee: R 4 M Tire Center, Inc., a Utah corporation 
Lessee's Address: 5690 South 900 East, Murray, Utah 84107 
Monthly Base Rent: $2,442 
3. Date of Lease: November 30, 1981 
Name of Lessee: PNS of Utah, Inc., a Utah corporation 
Lessee's Address: 5650 South 900 East, Murray, Utah 84107 
Monthly Base Rent: $4,583.33 
4. Date of Lease: September, 1987 
Name of Lessee: James P. Hill, Earl John Seely and William D. Townsend 
d/b/a Value Discount 'enter 
Lessee's Address: 876 East 5600 Soutr , Murray, Utah 84107 
Monthly Base Rent: $3,500 
5. Date of Lease: April 22, 1982 
Nare of Lessee: Skipper's Fish and Chips, Inc., 
a Washington corporation 
Lessee's Address: 880 East 5600 South, Murray, Utah 84107 
Monthly Base Rent: $950 
6. Date of Lease: April 8, 1968 
Na^e of Lessee: Earl B. Fillmore 
Lessee's Address: c/o Village Cleaners, 840 East 5600 South, 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Monthly Base Rent: $160 
7. Date of Lease: September 22, 1987 
Name of Lessee: Patricia Pankow and Impressive Images, Inc. 
Lessee's Address: 5626 South 900 East, Murray, Utah 84107 
Monthly Base Rent: $650 
8. Date of Lease: May 11, 1982 
Na^ ie of Lessee: Westley F. Sine 
Lessee's Address: 5664 South 900 East, Murray, Utah 84107 
Monthly Base Rent: $9,600 
9. Date of Lease: June 15, 1976 
Name of Lessee: Dee's, Inc., a Utah corporation 
(current tenant is Hardee's Family Restaurant) 
Lessee's Address: 5600 South 900 East, Murray, Utah 84107 
Monthly Base Rent: $700 
10. Date of Lease: July 9, 1986 
Name of Lessee: James R. Patterson 
Lessee's Address: 5632 South 900 East, Murray, Utah 84107 
Monthly Base Rent: $1,440 
11. Date of Lease: December 13, 1982 
Name of Lessee: Grace H.C. Ku and Charles H. Ku 
Lessee's Address: 5628 South 900 East, Murray, Utah 84107 
Monthly Base Rent: $832.99 
12. Date of Lease: January 20, 1987 
Name of Lessee: Bertha Smith, Dewayne Smith and Douglas Smith 
d/b/a Hairitage College of Beauty 
Lessee's Address: 5638 South 900 East, Murray, Utah 84107 
Monthly Base Rent: $1,938.33 
13. Date of Lease: May, 1982 
Name of Lessee: Amraddin Taghvai Arabi d/b/a The Copy Shop 
Lessee's Address: 850 East 5600 South, Murray, Utah 84107 
Monthly Base Rent: $650 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ASSIGNMENT 
EARL E. HOWE, VIVIAN HOWE, JOHN 0. HOWE and MAXINE HOWE, Lessors 
under the Lease described in the above and foregoing Assignment, hereby 
acknowledge the Assignment of Lease between Borrower and Bank and agree to 
give Bank fifteen (15) days notice of any claim or default against the 
Borrower under the above-described Lease and to allow Bank the opportunity 
to correct any such default within such period* 
The undersigned Lessors agree not to change or modify the terms of 
the above-described lease without notice to Bank. 
The Lessors acknowledge that the Lease is in full force and effect 
and the Borrower is not in default. 
Lessors acknowledge that Bank shall have no present obligation 
unaer the Lease and that Lessors shall look solely to Borrower for perfor-
mance, subject to Bank's right to cure any default following written 
notice. 
The foregoing Assignment and this Acknowledgement shall continue 
in full force and effect until written instructions to the contrary are 
received fron Bank. All notices and demands made to the Lessors shall be 
in writing and shall be delivered personally or sent by first class mail, 
postage pre-paid, addressed to Lessors at the address set forth below. 
DATED as of this day of January, 1988. 
LESSORS: 
EARL t. HOWE 
VIVIAN HOWE 
JOHN 0. HOWE 
-4-
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GERRIT M. STEENBLIK 
Two North Central Avenue 
Phoenix, Arizona 85004 
(602) 262-5846 
March 30, 1988 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
Mr. Larry K. Leeper 
Professional Manivest, Inc. 
255 East 400 South, Suite 2C0 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: South Lake Shopping Center 
Dear Larry: 
I am writing you on behalf of the current lessors 
pursuant to that certain Lease and Option Agreement dated October 
14, i960 first made by and among Earl E. Howe, Vivian Howe, 
John 0. Howe and Maxme Howe, as Lessors, and J. E. Lehnherr, 
Herman L. Franks and Stanford L. Hale, d/b/a Valley Shopping 
Center, as Lessees (the "Lease"). 
It is our position that Manivest, as the successor 
tc the Lessees, is in default of covenants in the Lease, including 
bur not limited to the following: 
1. The covenant to keep the premises free and clear 
cf all liens and encumbrances; 
2. The covenant not to assign the Lease without 
our prior written consent; and 
3. The covenant to maintain the premises and to 
keep them free from weeds and other obnoxious growth. 
For example, Manivestfs letter of January 22, 1988 
failed to disclose that on January 5, 1988, Manivest encumbered 
the premises by recording a Trust Deed and Assignment of Rents 
and by filing a Financing Statement in favor of Valley Bank 
and Trust Company. These encumbrances and Manivest's attempt 
to conceal them from us constitute flagrant violations of the 
Lease. Moreover, without seeking our "prior" consent, Manivest 
assigned its leasehold interest to Valley Bank and Trust Company 
Mr. Larry K. Leeper 
March 30, 1988 
Page 2 
on December 8, 1987. Furthermore, we recently inspected the 
shopping center and discovered that there are piles of 
Christmas-time trash and last year's crop of obnoxious weeds 
still located on the Premises, and that the surface of the parking 
lot is not and for some period of time has not been in good 
order or repair. 
Based upon these defaults, it is our position that 
we are entitled to terminate Manivest's rights under the Lease. 
At this time, I am also forwarding a transmittal letter 
and four checks which Salt Lake County recently sent to Robert 
E. Howe and me. Apparently, these checks represent the 1987 
property taxes refunded as a result of the appeal which Manivest 
filed with the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization. The 
checks are as follows: 
Check No. 29065--$ 872.72 
Check No. 29066--$ 2,908.95 
Check No. 29068--$ 727.25 
Check No. 29067 —$10 , 035 . 95 
Robert E. Kowe and I have both now had the opportunity to endorse 




cc: Mr. and Mrs. John 0. Howe 
Mr. and Mrs. Robert E. Howe 
Mr. and Mrs. William K. Evans 
, ~ r ^ .. - ^ ^ 
/ Gerri^ t M. S^eenblik 
Gertit M. Steenblik 
Two North Central Avenu 
Phoenix, Arizona 85004 
P«Er CBN/ED 
Mr. Larry K. Leeper 
Professional Muiuvest, Inc. 
2VJ East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84 111 
nou< 
LU — 
RECEIVED A?: - o 1S88 
PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST, INC. = = -_ E 3 ~ ~ " V - \~GEVE\~ :, 
A p r i l 1 , 1968 
G e r r i t iM. S t e e n b l i k , Esq . 
Two N o r t h C e n t r a l Avenue 
P h o e n i x , Ar i zona 85004 
Dear G e r r i t : 
RE: South Lake Shopping C e n t e r 
Murray , U t ah 
Thank you f o r r e m i t t i n g the t ax refund checks i s s u e d by the t r e a s u r e r / 
a u d i t o r ' s o f f i c e in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h our tax p r o t e s t on the South Lake Shopping 
C e n t e r . 
We a r e t r u l y s c r r y t h a t you f e e l we a r e in v i o l a t i o n of our l e a s e . As you 
know, we a r e s i n p l y a t t e m p t i n g to " run our b u s i n e s s " ; a n d , in t h a t o r d i n a r y 
c o u r s e , we, fror. time to t i m e , do some b o r r o w i n g . These bo r rowings do n o t 
a f f e c t the l e s s o r ' s p o s i t i o n ; and the a s s i g n m e n t i s f o r s e c u r i t y p u r p o s e s , 
o n l y . 
As i s t r e case eacn y e a r , e a r l y s p r i n g and the m e l t i n g snow uncover a sub-
s t a n t i a l amount of w i n t e r d e b r i s and , in some c a s e s , weeds . We w i l l do our 
b e s t t c m a i n t a i n Soutn Lake Shopping C e n t e r and w i l l do our b e s t to keep i t 
f u l l y r e n t e d . 
ThariKs, a g a i n f o r the checks and your l e t t e r of March 3 0 , 1966. 
We dc n o t f e e l we a r e in d e f a u l t of the l e a s e and can a s s u r e you t h e r e i s no 
i n t e n t on our p a r t to do s o . With t h i s l e t t e r , we a r e r e q u e s t i n g t h a t you l e t 
us knew shou ld you a t t e m p t to p r e s s a d e f a u l t . We w i l l do e v e r y t h i n g i n our 
power to p r o t e c t our i n t e r e s t and the i n t e r e s t s of our c l i e n t s . 
S i n c e r e l y , 
La r ry <. Leeper 
LKL nn 
c c Jor.n Z . ~ c-e 
k 
GERRIT M. STEENBLIK 
Two North Central Avenue 
Phoenix, Arizona 85004 
(602) 262-5846 
April 29, 1988 
CERTIFIED MAIL—RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
Mr. Larry K. Leeper 
Professional Mamvest, Inc. 
255 East 4C0 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: South Lake Shopping Center 
Dear Larrvj 
and, to say the least, we are very disappointed. "Running y 
business" dees net give ycu the right to jeopardize ours. 
But for the sinole first mcrtoace referred to 
caracrach 14 of the Lease, tnere is no ""uscifi cation vhatsce 
for the Valley Bank loan. Notwithstanding statements to 
contrary in your April 1st letter, the Valley Bank loan clea 
is intended to and dees affect our position as lessors. Am 
ether things, the Assignment of Lease and accompany 
Acknowledgement which ycu sent us on January 22, 198 3 as 
us to acree tnat 
(1) Manivest had the right to assign the Lease 
the bank; 
(2) the bank would be entitled to succeed to possess 
of the leased oremises and to exercise all richts under 
lease; 
;3) the bank would be entitled to 15 days notice 
any claim or default; and 
(4) Manivest was therebv encumberinc our inter 
Moreover, the form of the deed cf trust as recorded cemonstra 
voir intent to encumber our irterest, net merelv vcurs. 
Mr. Larrv K. Leeoer 
April 29~, 1988 
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In our opinion, you are being less Than candid to 
suaaest that this kind of borrowincr is in the "ordmarv course" 
of your business, or that it "dees nor ,_ 4. U the lessor's 
position," or that "the assignment is only for security purposes." 
The existing encumbrances and Manivest's attempt to conceal 
them are flaarant violations of the Lease. 
On behalf of the lessors, I hereby advise ycu that 
time is of the essense and that we insist upon strict performance 
of all of the covenants, restrictions and conditions in the 
Lease. 
Gl>lS/z~~ 
Verv truiv vjirsr 
Mr. Rccert I. Hcwe 
Mr. Jcnn D. Hcwe 
Ms, Carole Evans 
evidence relative to the Transfer and such other documents as 
the Trustees may reasonal^y request with respect to the 
Transfer. 
2.8 Trustee Books and Records. The Trustee shall 
cause to be kept, at such place or places within or without the 
State of Utah as the Trustee may determine, books and records 
reflecting tne percentage interests of each of the 
Beneficiaries herein and all transactions relating to the Trust 
Assets. Any Beneficiary may, upcn reasonable notice to the 
trustee and curing normal business hours of the Trustees, 
inspect such becks anc reccrcs. 
The Trustees shall cause the S\ _ . . Ui* **«, , 
"Ian
 0 e r t o r e n d e r t c t he B e n e f i c i a r i e s , t he Manives t Group, 
P s a r r a s , ZAIAC anc J e n e a c : (ix» an u n a u d i t e d q u a r t e r l y r e p o r t 
anc '11} an a u d i t ec annual r e r o r t of t h e o p e r a t i o n s and 
f i n a n c i a l c c n c i r i c n cf t ne T r u s t . 
Cla ims. The T r u s t e e s naj 
-* .e i r s e e d i s c r e t i o n , a u t n c r i c e tne Manager to s e t t l e or 
comrrcmi . e any c l a m , i n c l u d i n g out n e t l i m i t e d t o c la ims by 
tne B e n e f i c i a r i e s 
pr ^I-MT-V 
-•i* ANT SUBSTITUTION 0? GENERAL PARTNERS 
2 . 1 Retirement of Professional Manivest. 
-imul t anecuc lv «itn tne execution of tnis Trusr Agreement by 
all of the parties hereto, Professional Manivest shall retire 
as the general partner and appoint the Trust as the successor 
general partner of each of the following partnerships: MFP 
Investments, Ltd.; Southwestern Realty, Ltd.; Diversified 
Investments, Ltd.; Realty Management, Ltd.; M.D. Investments, 
Ltd.; PMI Associates, Ltd.; Intermountain Realty, Ltd.; 
National Realty, Ltd.; Spcrts Investments, Ltd.; Western 
Investments Associates, Ltd.; Eastern Realty, Ltd.; Jenead 
Investments, Ltd.; Resources Realty, Ltd. The Trust hereby 
accepts its appointment as the successor general partner of 
s<uch partnership, subject to ratification by the limited 
partners of each such partnership. 
3 . 2 Retirement of Manivest Investments. 
Simultaneously with the execution of this Trust Agreement by 
all cf the parties hereto, Manivest Investments shall retire as 
the general partner and appoint the Trust as the successor 
general partner of each of the following partnerships: 
Tri-Cicies Investments, Ltd.; Grandridge Investments, Ltd.; 
Jadwin Investments, Ltd. and Plaza 5300, Ltd. The Trust hereby 
•accepts the appointment as the successor general partner of 
such partnership, subject to ratification by the general 
partners of each such partnerships. 
2.5 Retirement cf Psarras, Simultaneously with the 
executicn cf this Trust Agreement by all of the parties hereto, 
DIVERSIFIED REALTY INVESTMENTS LIMITED 




All of the assets owned by the partnership were held in 
the name of Professional Manivest Inc. , rather than in 
the partnership name. Since the Trust was formed 
these properties, except South Lake Shopping Center 
because of a land lease restriction and Woodhollow V 
because of negotiations with the lender, are now vested 
in the partnership name. The properties, except South 
Lake Shopping Center, are valued based upon our best 
estimated of the net income in 19S3 capitalized at 10% 
and discounted back at 13%- Diversified Realty's cost 
of South Lake Shopping Center was $1,813,000, 
Woodhollow V (50%) was $2,975,000, and Woodcreek 
Village (50%) was $2,500,000. The Woodcreek Apartments 
were purchased by Diversified Realty in 1976 for 
$2,500,000 (50%) and then sold to Tri Cities 
Investments Limited in August 1984 for $3,250,000 
through Westco Realty, a subsidiary of Manivest 
corporation. No payments on the Diversified Equity had 
been received since December 1984, and Tri Cities 
Investments Limited had sustained a cash loss of 
approximately $1,000,000 thru December 1987. In 
January 1988 the property was taken back by Diversified 
Realty. The current value of Woodcreek Apartments is 
shewn equal to the underlying debt. 
See separate section on Intermcuntain Realty Limited. 
PJEAL ESTATE CONTRACTS: 
Glenhollow Apartments 
Glenhcllow (Heritage Village) was sold to 
Vesteq Corporation on 9/23/83 for $3,281,333 
with cash down to an all inclusive note in 
the amount or $2,575,000. The terms of the 
note called for interest only payment at 10% 
until Maturity, 9/23/93. " Payments were 
received until early 1986. The property was 
foreclosed upon in August of 198 6 and resold 
to Phillip Gray Living Trust on 12/23/8 6 for 
$2,200,000 with cash down to a $2,020,000 
all-inclusive note. The terms of the note 
call for interest only at 9% during the first 
year; beginning the second year payments of 
$17,726.95 including interest at 10%, with 
the unpaid balance due 12/1/89. In February 
1958 the note was modified to allow reduced 
payments equal to the underlying debt for a 
period of six months with two automatic six 
month extensions until Julv 1989 arc then a 
five month extension u n t i l Dec 1989. The 
subsequent six month & five month extensions 
may be rescinded by the payee with 60 days 
p r i o r wri t ten notice in any of the extension 
per iods . 
Townhouse Apartments 
This property was sold to another partnership 
thru Westco Realty Inc. Diversified Realty 
has a receivable from the Trust which is 
unsecured. See Note 4. 
Rose Haven Apartments 
This property was sold to another partnership 
thru Westco Realty Inc. Diversified Realty 
has a receivable from the Trust which is 
unsecured. See Note 4. 
Mark IV Apartments and Marx IV Commercial Space 
This property was sold to another partnership 
thru westco Realty Inc. Diversified Realty 
has a receivable from the Trust which is 
unsecured. See Note 4. 
Casa Nueva Apartments (50%) 
This property was sold to another partnership 
thru Westco Realty Inc. Diversified Realty 
has a receivable from the Trust which is 
unsecured. See Note 4. 
Olympus Apartments 
Since all the assets owned by the partnership 
vers held in the name of Professional 
Manivest Inc., these properties were scid 
without the oartnershit retaining* a secured 
interest in the prcoerty. The crccerties 
were later scid to an outside unrelated third 
party for all cash. The funds were used by 
Manivest to fund it's operations, make loans 
to other partnerships to keep from losing 
their real estate, and for buy-out payments. 
These receivables will be paid from the 
Trust. See Note 4* 
> *-. °^ 4 : R e c e i v a b l e Manives t L i q u i d a t i o n Trusi 
The p a r t n e r s h i p ' s u n d i v i d e d i n t e r e s t i n seven 
u n i t s a t Corcnado Shores and two u n i t s a t I s l a n d 
Beach Club, was t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e T r u s t w i t h the 
t r a n s f e r e e ' s e q u i t y i n c r e a s i n g n o t e r e c e i v a b l e 
from t h e T r u s t . Th i s was d e n e b e c a u s e t h e 
m a j o r i t y cf t h e ownersh ip b e l o n g s t o t h e Manivest 
Grout and had been used as c o l l a t e r a l a c a i n s t a l l 
of F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank C r e d i t L i n e s . For 
a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n see t h e F i r s t S e c u r i t y 3anx 
o a •— •=: ~ ^ c—. -. ~ s + z.^. — oe r e t a i l 
the Trust and will bear interest at Valley Bank 
and Trust prime rate not to exceed 11%. 
This receivable was also adjusted by the Manivest 
Group Equity on South Lake Shopping Center and The 
Outrigger Apartments Contract Receivable, and any 
fees accruing the new general partner. Below is a 
summary of how the receivable was calculated: 
Equity on Coronado 9% $ 216,065 
Equity on Island Beach Club 9% 23,580 
South Lake Shopping Center f477, 978) 
Outrigger Contract Receivable 483,218 
Accrued Fees f102 ,5?3) 
Note Total $ 142,292 
Mortgages on Properties: 
Wocdcreek Village Apartments 50% 
Woodcreek Village Joint Venture 
Balance $ 1,477,849 
Interest Rate 9.125% 
Wocdcreek Village Joint Venture 
Balance $ 72,928 
Interest Rate 9.125% 
Wccdhcllcv V 
Garth Ncrthvcod Joint Venture 
Balance $ 1,722,910 
Interest Rate 10.25% 
Garth Ncrthvccd Joint Venture 
Balance $ 175,000 
Interest Rate 10.25% 
Glenncllcv Apartments 
Murray Investments 
Balance $ 1,265,076 
Interest Rate 10.5% 
South Lake Shopping Center 
Pledged as security on Valley Bank loan.. See 
schedule cf loans on the Manivest Liquidating 
Land Lease: The property is subject to a 
land lease that expires 10/15/2010. The 
yearly lease payment is $11,791. This lease 
has net been capitalized. 
PROPERTY CASH FLOW PROJECTION 1988 - 1993 
l i o n : 
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DIVERSIFIED REALTY INVESTMENTS LIMITED 
BALANCE SHEET 
AT APPROXIMATE FAIR MARKET VALUE 
1 2 / 3 1 / 8 7 
ASSETS 
I IN BANK 
CELLANEOUS ASSETS 
lERTY (NOTE 1) 
loUTH LAKE SHOPPING CENTER (SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH) 
fcOODHOLLOW V (50%) (3AYT0WN, TEXAS) 
KCODCREEX APARTMENTS (50%) (3AYT0WN, TEXAS) 
blMENTS IN PARTNERSHIPS: 
fNTERMCUNTAIN REALTY LIMITED (NOTE 2) 
, ESTATE CONTRACTS RECEIVABLE (NOTE 3) 
OWNHOUSE APARTMENTS (CARSON CITY, NEVADA) 
fcCSE HAVEN APARTMENTS (SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH) 
k? IV APARTMENTS (SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH) 
pA^rt NUEVA APARTMENTS (DALLAS, TEXAS) 
LYMPUS APARTMENTS (DALLAS, TEXAS) 
fcLENHOLLCW APARTMENTS (ARLINGTON, TEXAS) 
EIVA3LE MANIVEST LIQUIDATING TRUST (NOTE 4) 
1AL ASSETS 
URITY DEPOSITS & OTHER LIABILITIES ON PROPERTIES 
TGAGES PAYABLE ON PROPERTIES (NOTE 5) 
GLZNKOLLOW APARTMENTS 
WCODHCLLCW V APARTMENTS (50%) 
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T r D£?CSi7)CN EXHIBIT L 1 
Tab 30 
RECEIVED 
JUL 2 9 1988 
MORGAN. SCALLEY 4 READING 
J u l y 27 , 1988 
Mr. J. Bruce Reading 
Morgan, Scalley & Reading 
26i"East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: South Lake Shopping Center 
Dear Mr. Reading: 
The purpose of this letter is to confirm our recent 
telephone conversations. On Friday, July 22, 1988, 1 informed 
you that the members of the Howe family were deeply concerned 
about the weeds and ether obnoxious growth on the southwest 
portion cf the shopping center property, and particularly about 
the fire hazard to adjacent fences and improvements. I also 
advised you that we had obtained a bid from a person who was 
prepared immediately to clean up the weeds and other rubbish; 
but before doing so, I first wanted to confirm that Mamvest 
would net construe our efforts to solve this problem as an attempt 
to wrcncfullv take possession of the prcterty nor as a willingness 
ts obligations so long as it 
possession. I further exclair.ee that even if Manivest 
•ect these defaults, it would not reinstate the Lease 
:e evidence that fcr the past several months Mamvest 
•o keen the cremises free from weeds and ether obnoxious 
: resrended that vcu would need to discuss this issue 
.- snort time _ater, ycu ca„ec me sac* to ir.rerm me 
iur client was net yet willing to allow us to solve the 
: but that Larry Leeper, to whom you had spoken, was going 
•enallv investigate the matter, and that vcu would call 
On Tuesday, when ycu called, you informed me that 
Larry Leeper had visited the shopping center and had reported 
back to ycu that we "were absolutely right, it's a mess," and 
that until his visit he had not known how bad the situation 
had become. You further stated that Manivest was not willing 
to allow us to solve the problem, but would instead start solving 
the problem the following day. In response, I reiterated our 
ocsition that the Lease is terminated, that we are entitled 
Mr. J. Bruce Reading 
July 27, 1968 
Page 2 
to step in and cure these problems, and that even if Manivest 
were to correct the problems, it would not alter our position, 
Very truly^ours, 
GMS/pmn 
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U V M O N O *• M**"" 
< . A - C S CUCGC 
»•€•.>* • ^ • • C » T 
OAv.O » JCACCC 
At . A * . . *A»SO* 
J O — C G^TCS 
• ••CWT STC»**CNS 
- • C W A C L • C*«USTON 
GCO»GC * MUMT 
ZLUOT* J. «t iu*»«5 
OAVIO G. **V.UA*«S 
•CJC C. MAOSCN 
MAX 0. W M C C L C * 
•Aul. W. G*Ar 
» » u i C. OMOZ 
M I C ^ A C U 3 SUACKSUAM 
»0»C«rr m -CNOCWSO* 
Src»«CN »OT» 
O C H W S C. T » G u S O * 
3 A M I A M C . S**ITW 
5TT»wC* J. »tUC 
• »UCC N. JCNSCN 
*tM*V A. CHAJ If 
••rrCC 0 » * H Z ? « 
JOO* H »W"**C'"T 
STA*W£T « STOl-W 
OAVIO - CAsnco* 
mmmllA G. « C ^ t * * » A * 
OAVIO M SwkuG*»TC» 
S T A W U C J W » C S T O « 
THOMAS M l A « * 
JO* L s«Nocin 
* SCOTT »OwCLk 
SMAW*t C. 3IANCT 
J C » » Y O ' ! > * 
CfUuG » M t i O w 
jO»«« • LUWO 
•TAN C. Tl BUTTS 
AMMC S««CNSCN 
A»*0»CW M -0"SC 
• • C H A A O A. VAN WAGOMCK 
SAVIG w STCrrtNSO* 
ukiurr «. U H Y C O C * 
• o a c ^ c *cu.c» 
CUiABCTw M N G M C N N A N 
OANlC* 0. *»U. 
SAKBAAA J OlCHCT 
J O « » « U W O O O 
LAW o m c E S 
SNOW, C H R I S T Z N S E N & MAirrrsnEAU 
iO E X C H A N G E * » L A C £ . C L E V C N T H ruOOW 
POST o r r i C E BOX 4 5 0 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8 * * * 5 
T C L C » » O N C I80D S2I-9000 
TZLCCO*>C* IBOI) J 6 3 - 0 4 0 0 
THUIMAN 4 SOTMCMVAMO « # « 
TMUMMAM. SWTTMCIKAMO 4 « M C »••« 
TwtfWiwi «CDGwOOO 4 >AVNC »906 
t«VW»C S*CtN 4 TMUM4AM 1022 
S*CC*. THOINAA**. WOWS4XT 4 S^Ow t9ii 
wOwStXr. SMOW 4 CHA»STCWSCN I M 7 
JO«*N H. S N O W I » I 7 - « 9 6 0 
or cou«sc 
JOSCP* NOVAK 
GCOMGC ** . L A » S C * 
wWiTCITS 0«»CCT N U M S C * 
August 22, 1988 
322-9142 
HAND DELIVERED 
J. Bruce Reading, Esq. 
Morgan, Sealley & Reading 
26l"East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: South Lake Shopping Center 
Dear Mr. Reading: 
Since your letter dated June 6, 1988 to Larry G. Moore, 
this law firm has undertaken to represent the Howe family as 
the lessors oursuant to the South Lake ShocDinc Center Lease, 
Under the facts as we now understand them, we find it 
rer 
fait* 
a r K ac .e for ycu to speak of the Howe family acting in "bad 
or of Manivest's "willincness tc cure anv defaults." 
v^ « ~ 
There is no doubt that the Lease prohibits all encumbrances 
anv nature, whether on the Lessee's interest or the Lessor's 
interest. Despite the Howe family's repeated demands, Manivest 
has clearly violated this covenant. 
Manivest fiagr 
1988 when, without 
Manivest recorded 
Trust Deed) agains 
all-encompassing 1 
way limit or indie 
hold interest, whi 
But the Trust Deed 
interest in our cl 
without disclosinc 
antly breached this covenant on January 5, 
even requesting our clients' consent, 
a Trust Deed and Assignment of Rents (the 
t the property. This Trust Deed contains 
ien language and does not appear to in any 
ate that it encumbers only Manivest's lease-
ch itself would be a violation of the Lease, 
goes beyond that and purports to convey an 
ients' real property. A few weeks later, 
the existence of this Trust Deed, Manivest 
J. Bruce Reading, Esq. 
August 22, 1988 
Page 2 
asked our clients to execute an Acknowledgment of Assignment by 
which our clients, had they signed, would have consented to an 
encumbrance against "their interest in the property." The 
precise language of the Acknowledgement of Assignment is as 
follows: 
The undersigned acknowledges that the Lessee is 
encumbering their interest in the property and said 
loan is hereby approved as recruired by said Lease. 
(Emphas i s added.) 
This language directly contradicts the assertions in your 
letter. It is compelling evidence that Manivest sought to 
encumber the interest of our clients. Manivest, however, in 
its January 22nd transmittal letter to the Howe family, mis-
characterized these facts by suggesting that Valley Bank had 
merely "taken an assignment of Manivest's leasehold interest." 
3ased on these documents and the admissions, there is no doubt 
(i) that Manivest had breached the Lease, (ii) that Manivest 
knew it had breached the Lease, and (iii) that Manivest 
attempted to persuade the merriers of the Howe family to sub-
ordinate their interest, without first disclosing relevant 
facts. 
The covenant in the lease is very clear with respect to the 
obligation cf Manivest to net encumber the leasehold or the 
Property. The reference in your letter to Mr. Mccre suggesting 
in effect a prior course cf dealing or other justification to 
claim the right to encumber the property en any ether basis is 
rejected. Since your June 6, 1988 letter, the Howe family has 
for the first time obtained a copy cf the Assignment of Rents 
and Leases and the Trust Deed which Manivest recorded in May of 
1978 in favor of First Security Bank as well as a copy of the 
Assignment cf Lease for Security which Manivest recorded in 
favor of Valley Bank and Trust Company-in May of 1982. On these 
prior occasions, Manivest did so without our clients' knowledge 
or consent. Thus, instead of serving as an excuse for the 
current violations, the earlier unauthorized encumbrances and 
assignments compound the problem. A review of the covenants of 
the lease coupled with examination of the unauthorized and 
undisclosed encumbrances leads inescapably to the conclusion 
that Manivest has engaged in a pattern of intentionally violat-
ive the lease and withholdina information from the Howe familv. 
J. Bruce Reading, Esq. 
August 22, 1988 
Page 3 
We do not find from our examination of the documents and 
from our review of the conduct of the parties any support what-
soever for the rather casual assertion that the Howe family has 
acted in "bad faith" or that Manivest has shown any "willingness 
to cure any default." The Howe family has acted reasonably and 
properly and views the intransigence of Manivest very seriously. 
Our clients do not expect that the courts will ignore breaches 
which are both willful and persistent. 
We, therefore, reiterate our clients' demand that Manivest 
surrender possession of the property, and we again tender all 
rent checks received since our clients became aware of the 
aforementioned breaches of the Lease. Manivest's continued 
attempts to pay rent will not create a new tenancy or reinstate 
the Lease. 
Very truly yours, 
ENOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
V ^ J A, d £JC1_ 
Michael R. Carlston 
MRC:wp 
SCMMRC3 8 5 
4 4 VALLEY BANK 
Y& TRUST COMPANY 
ADMINISTRATIVE 0FFIC28 
80 WZST BROADWAY, 11TH FLOOR SALT LAKZ CITY, UTAH 84101 
( 8 0 1 ) 4 8 1 - 6 1 8 9 
September 8, 1988 
Mr, J. Bruce Reading 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys at Law 
261 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Manivest Corporation: Line of Credit with Valley Bank 
Dear Bruce: 
This letter is directed to you as legal counsel for Manivest 
Corporation and Professional Manivest, Inc. • As you know, in 
December, 1987 Valley Bank and Trust Company committed to extend 
a $4 million line of credit to Manivest, Inc. and Professional 
Manivest Corporation ("Borrowers"). A loan agreement was 
prepared and it was agreed that part of the security for the loan 
would consist of an assignment of the Borrowers1 interest in that 
certain lease agreement dated October 14, 1960 between Earl D. 
Howe, Vivian Howe, John 0. Howe and Maxine Howe, as Lessors and 
the Borrowers, as Lessee. An assignment of lease was prepared as 
was an acknowledgement to be executed by the Lessors. The 
Borrowers represented that the lease was assignable and that the 
consent and acknowledgement of the Lessors could be obtained. 
The assignment of lease has not been recorded as Valley Bank 
has been waiting for the executed acknowledgement to be returned. 
As of this date, Valley Bank has not received the acknowledgement 
and you have now informed us that there may be some difficulty in 
obtaining the acknowledgement of the Lessors. Please be aware 
that Valley Bank and Trust Company only desires an assignment of 
the "leasehold interest owned by the Borrowers and does not seek 
to obtain any interest in the real property which would be 
superior to the fee ownership of the Howes or their successors. 
Valley Bank merely desires that in the event the Borrowers fail 
to make the required payments to the Lessors that Valley Bank be 
entitled to receive a notice of default and have the opportunity 
to make the required payments. Valley Bank has approximately one 
billion in assets and we are not sure why the Lessors would be 
reluctant to have Valley Bank take an assignment of the lease as 
it would provide additional guarantee of future payments. 
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Mr. J. Bruce Readina 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Nevertheless, because the assignment of lease has not been 
effectuated by delivery of the acknowledgement, the line of 
credit is in default. Valley Bank was counting on receiving this 
lease as collateral and, without the consent of the Howes, the 
assignment cannot be recorded and, in fact, no security interest 
in the lease can be granted. Unless the assignment of lease or 
substitute collateral having a fair market value of approximately 
$2 million is delivered to Valley Bank prior to the end of 
September, 1988, you are on notice that Valley Bank may declare a 
default and require that the line of credit be reduced 
accordingly. 
Please contact us if you wish to discuss this further. 
Very truly yours, 
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY 
Brad R. Baldwin 
Senior Vice President and 
General Counsel 
BRB:js 
cc: Randy Cameron 
Northern Region Commercial Loan Center 
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September 28, 1988 
Mr. Michael R. Car ls ton 
At to rney a t Law 
Snow, Chr is tensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place , Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Re: South Lake Shopping Center 
Dear Mr. Carlston: 
This letter is 
August 22, 1988. My 
any of the covenants 
dated October 14, 1960, 
of breaching the lease 
surrender the premises, 
rental payments as such 
agreement. My client 
insist upon pursuing 
agreement. 
written in response to your 
client's position that it has 
of that certain lease 
rema ins unchanged. 
agreement in the future, 
Manivest will continue 
become due under the terms 
finds it regrettable that 
their attempt to terminate 
letter dated 
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and option agreement, 
It has no intention 
nor will it 
to make all 
of the lease 
your clients 
this lease 
we nave attac 
full reconveyance 
Trust. You will 
permission for 








er, release or 
client from Valley Bank & 
clients1 refusal to grant 
the lease as collateral is 
jeopardizing a four million dollar line of credit. We believe 
that your clients are violating their covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing in refusing to agree to the assignment to Valley 
Bank & Trust Company. No bona fide reason for the refusal to 
grant permission has ever been given. 
Be advised that should Valley Bank & Trust elect to default 
our client!s debt because of tfte arbitrary refusal of your 
clients to agree to the assignment/ ou: firm has been instructed 
to immediately file an action against your clients to recover all 
damages sustained because of the default. You will note that 
Friday, September 30, 1988, has been set as the deadline to 
supply the approval of the assignment. Be advised that this 
Mr- Michael R. Carlston 
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assignment is the only collateral available to our client to 
satisfy Valley Bank. We firmly believe the courts will nat allow 
the caprice of your clients to cause our client damage. 
We are confident that the lease agreement has not been 
breached. Even assuming arguendo that one or more of the 
asserted breaches have occurred, no court would declare a 
forfeiture based upon such non-material breaches. We are 
confident, however, that our client will be entitled to damages 
sustained by your clients1 refusal to consent to the assignment. 
My client will continue to tender the rent checks because we deem 
that no breach on our part has occurred. 
Sincerely^upurs, 
MORGAN/SCALLEY £ READING 
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Mr. Bruce Reading, Esq. 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
261 East 300 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: South Lake Shopping Center/Professional Manivest 
Dear Mr. Reading: 
Your letter of September 2S, 1988 was delivered to my 
office very late in the day, and I was unaware of its 
delivery until this morning. I have forwarded your letter 
and the enclosures it contains to my clients. We will 
review these materials and respond. I believe that it is 
extremely unreasonable for your clients to study my letter 
from August 22, 1988 until September 28, 1988, and then 
attempt to impose a deadline of two days. To do so, and 
to accompany it with the representations of such drastic 
consequence, suggest a lack of good faith on the part of 
your clients in its dealings with respect to this business 
reiationshiD. 
Very truly yours, 
Slow, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
k_</pW /) C^J6^-. 
Michael R. Carlston 
MRC/dwb 
Tab 31 
SOUTH LAKE SHOPPING CENTER 
ESTIMATED PRESENT VALUE OF LEASEHOLD 
\ HISTORICAL AVERAGE \ 
12 YRS 7 YRS 3YRS 1989 LAST 5 MOS- 1989 
1978 - 1989 1983 - 1989 1987 - 1989 
POSSIBLE INCOME 343,000 423,000 453,000 430,000 434,000 
VACANCIES & LOST RENTS (54,000) (66,000) (118,000) (108,000) (165,000) 
INCOME RECEIVED 289,000 357,000 335,000 322,000 269,000 
EXPENSES 144,000 163,000 154,000 168,000 212,000 
CASH FLOW 145,000 194,000 181,000 154,000 57,000 
REPLACEMENT COST --
BUDGET EXCEEDS ACTUAL (12,000) (17,000) (31,000) (33,000) (33,000) 
ADJUSTED CASH FLOW 133,000 177,000 150,000 121,000 24,000 
PRESENT VALUE OF CASH FLOW 923,000 1,228,000 1,041,000 839,000 167,000 
CURRENT REPAIRS NEEDED 360,000 360,000 360,000 360,000 360,000 
ADJUSTED PRESENT VALUE 563,000 868,000 681,000 479,000 (193,000) 
Tab 32 
RECEIVED 
JUL 2 9 1988 
MORGAN. SCALLEY « Rc^,-
July 27, 1988 
Mr. J. Bruce Reading 
Morgan, Scalley & Reading 
261 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: South Lake Shopping Center 
Dear Mr. Reading: 
The purpose of this letter is to confirm our recent 
telephone conversations. On Friday, July 22, 1988, I informed 
you that the members of the Howe family were deeply concerned 
about the weeds and other obnoxious growth on the southwest 
portion cf the shopping center property, and particularly about 
the fire hazard to adjacent fences and improvements. I also 
advisee ycu that we had obtained a bid from a person who was 
prepared immediately to clean up the weeds and other rubbish; 
but before doing so, I first wanted to cenfirm that Manivest 
would net construe our efforts to solve mis problem as an attempt 
to wrongfully take possession of the property nor as a willingness 
to relieve Manivest from any cf its obligations so long as it 
remains in possession. I further explained that even if Manivest 
were to correct these defaults, it would net reinstate the Lease 
nor alter tne evidence that for the past several months Manivest 
had felled to keep the premises free from weeds and ether obnoxious 
growth. Ycu responded that ycu would need to discuss this issue 
with ycur client. 
A short time later, you called me back to inform me 
that ycur client was net yet willing to allow us to solve the 
problem but that Larry Leeper, to whom you had spoken, was going 
to personally investigate the matter, and that you would call 
On Tuesday, when you called, you informed me that 
Larry Leeper had visited the shopping center and had reported 
back to you that we "were absolutely right, it's a mess," and 
that until his visit he had not known how bad the situation 
had become. You further stated that Manivest was not willing 
to allow us to solve the problem, but would instead start solving 
the problem the following day. In response, I reiterated our 
position that the Lease is terminated, that we are entitled 
Mr. J. Bruce Reading 
July 27, 1988 
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to step in and cure these problems, and that even if Manivest 
were to correct the problems, it would not alter our position, 
Very truly uours, 
GMS/pmn 
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J. Bruce Reading, Esc. 
Korean, Scalley & Reading 
261 East 30C South 
Salt lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: South Lake Shopping Center 
Tear Kr . Readinc: 
Since y~ur letter dated June 6, 1988 to Larry G. Moore, 
tr:s lav f: - has undertaker, to represent the Hove family as 
tne lessors pursuant to tne Scut;. La.<s Shopping Center Lease 
r - s - ~ «*K 0 ~ T*J • * • w:.:e: tne : a : : s as ve now unce 
.r-•!ac 1 e for vzu to steak c r **^ ° v^^a *a-« 
.n ' or of K a m v e s t ' s "v i l l i r . cness to cure anv d e f a u l t s . " 
anc trier?, ve r m c i 
 stea  of the Hove f r t i lv ao tmc in "bad 
•t the _ease t r o m o i t s a l . encurr.br ances 
. a t u r e, vne t n er :ne -essee s i n t e r e s t c: he Lessor's 
interest. Tespite tne Hove far.._y's repeated demands, Manivest 
has clearlv violated this covenant. 
Kanivest flagrantly breached this covenant en January 5, 
19B£ vhen, without even requesting our clients' consent, 
y.anivest reccrded a Trust Deed and Assignment cf Rents (the 
;t Deec) acamst th .s Trust Teed contains 
all-enccrpassmg lien language and dees not appear to in any 
way lirr.it cr indicate that it encurJbers only Kanivest' s lease-
held .nterest, vhicn itself would be a violation of the Lease 
5-t tne Trust Teed goes beyond that and purports to convey an 
interest in cur clients' real property. A few weeks later, 
• .::.:.: oisrlosmc the existence cf tnis Trust Deez, Manivest 
J. Bruce Reading, Esc. 
August 22, 1988' 
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We do net find from our examination of the documents and 
from cur review of the conduct of the parties any support what-
soever fcr the rather casual assertion that the Howe family has 
acted in "bad faith" or that Manivest has shown any "willingness 
to cure any default." The Howe family has acted reasonably and 
prcperly and views the intransigence of Manivest very seriously. 
Ou: clients dc not expect that the courts will ignore breaches* 
which are both willful and persistent. 
We, therefore, reiterate our clients* demand that Manivest 
surrender possession of the property, and we again tender all 
rent checks received since cur clients became aware of the 
aforementioned breaches cf the Lease. Manivest's continued 
attempts to pay rent will net create a new tenancy or reinstate 
tne lease. 
Very truly yours, 
ENCW, CKRISTENSZN & M^TINZAU 
Michael R. Carlstcn 
Page Two 
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Mr. J, Bruce Reading 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Nevertheless, because the assignment of lease has not been 
effectuated by delivery of the acknowledgement, the line of 
credit is in default. Valley Bank was counting on receiving this 
lease as collateral and, without the consent of the Howes, the 
assignment cannot be recorded and, in fact, no security interest 
in the lease can be granted. Unless the assignment of lease or 
substitute collateral having a fair market value of approximately 
$2 million is delivered to Valley Bank prior to the end of 
September, 1988, you are on notice that Valley Bank may declare a 
default and require that the line of credit be reduced 
accordingly. 
Flease contact us if you wish to discuss this further. 
Very truly yours, 
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY 
Brad R. Baldwin 
Senior Vice President and 
General Counsel 
era . -;s 
cc: Randy Cameron 
Northern Region Commercial Loan Cente: 
VALLEY BANK"AND TRUST COMPANY 
K.L. Kirkham 
Branch/Credit Administration 
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY 
Mr. Michael R. Carlston 
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assignment is the only collateral available to our client to 
satisfy Valley Bank- We firmly believe the courts will net allow 
the caprice of your clients to cause our client damage. 
We are confident that the lease agreement has not been 
breached. Even assuming arguendo that one or more of the 
asserted breaches have occurred, no court would declare a 
forfeiture based upon such non-material breaches. We are 
confident, he-ever, that our client *ill be entitled to damages 
sustained by your clients' refusal t' consent to the assignment-
My client will continue tc tinder th« rent zhecks because we deem 
that : breach on cur p ar t :.is occurred. 
S ince re ly^purs , 
MORGAN/SCALLEY & READING 
Bruce ^eacmc 
Tab 42 
SOUTH LAKE SHOPPING CENTER 
ESTIMATED PRESENT VALUE OF LEASEHOLD 
\ HISTORICAL AVERAGE \ 
12 YRS 7 YRS 3YRS 1989 LAST 5 MOS. 1989 
1978 - 1989 1983 - 1989 1987 - 1989 
POSSIBLE INCOME 





BUOGET EXCEEDS ACTUAL 
ADJUSTED CASH FLOW 
PRESENT VALUE OF CASH FLOW 
CURRENT REPAIRS NEEDED 
ADJUSTED PRESENT VALUE 
343,000 423,000 453,000 430,000 434,000 
(54,000) (66,000) (118,000) (108,000) (165,000) 
289,000 357,000 335,000 322,000 269,000 
144,000 163,000 154,000 168,000 212,000 
145,000 194,000 181,000 154,000 57,000 
(12,000) (17,000) (31,000) (33,000) (33,000) 
133,000 177,000 150,000 121,000 24,000 
923,000 1,228,000 1,041,000 839,000 167,000 
360,000 360,000 360,000 360,000 360,000 
563,000 868,000 681,000 479,000 (193,000) 
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 22nd day cf February, 
the deposition of ROBERT P. LEONARD, produced as a 
ss herein at the instance of the defendants in the 
-entitled action now pending in the above-named court, was 
before Diane M. Winter, a Certified Shorthand Reporter 
nse No, 235), Registered Professional Reporter and Notary 
c in and for the State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 
a.m. of said day at the offices of Prince, Yeates & 
abler, 175 East Fourth South, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, 
Reporter: Diane M. Winter 
^ - IERIT ^ 
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r (801) 322-3742 5 DAY DELIVERY 
185 South State Street • Suite 380 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiffs: Michael R. Carlston 
SNOW, CKRISTENSEN & MARTNIEAU 
Eleventh Floor Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake~City, Utah 84111 
For the Defendants: Brian S. King 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre I - Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Witness 
ROBERT P. LEONARD 
Examination by Mr. King, 
I N D E X 
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2 
doing further work at the property to prepare your testimony in 
2 I the case? 
3 A Not to my knowledge at this point in time. 
4 Q Did ycu make any inspection of part of the property, 
5 I believe it's immediately in front of the tire store on the 
6 south part of the property, where there are some abandoned fuel 
7 filling tanks? 
8 A Yes, I did go over there. 
9 Q VJhat did you observe about that? 
10 A Observation of the building prior to becoming 
11 involved as well as after with the covers over the gas tanks I 
12 didnft even think that the place was in business. Very 
13 difficult with the condition the way it looks out front to know 
14 whether or not that place is in business. I went in there 
15 myself personally about six months ago to check on some tires 
16 and that was the only reason I knew that they were even 
17 possibly in business. The entryways were in need of some 
18 repair on the one entry, as I recall, and the condition of 
19 those gas tanks, like you say, they had covers over them, the 
2C light poles were -- part of them were there, part of them 
21 weren't. Asphalt around the building, especially on the south 
22 I side, was in not good condition. That was my general 
observation. 
Q You were on the roof on Saturday; is that right? 
A Correct. 
14 
here. And I'll just say that overall the roofs are in a 
condition that they are not being maintained very well. And I 
think that there is others that can answer the questions as far 
as the roof condition — my responsibility is just an overall 
general observation of what I've seen there, what I've been 
asked to look at. 
Q You said earlier that you went inside the buildings 
and locked at some of the interiors. Was your only purpose in 
going inside to look at the interiors of the building to notice 
what, if any, leakage had occurred? 
(Off the record.) 
A Generally it was to go in and observe leakage from 
the roof and just general observation. That was it. 
Q Okay. Other than the information that you've given 
us before about the leakage that you noticed in the three 
spaces did you have any other things that come to mind that you 
gained from your general observation? 
A I don't remember anything at this point, no. 
Q Okay. You mentioned that you observed the exterior 
of the improvements on the property, the structures on the 
property. 
A (Witness nodding head.) 
Q What did you observe from your visual inspection of 
the exterior of the buildings? 
A Seme of the concrete around the buildings were in 
24 
somewhat of a deteriorated nature, and possibility of being 
unsafe, but at least in not a repaired state. The other was on 
planters around the shopping center where the brick around the 
planters was severely deteriorated from winter conditions, 
freeze thaw, over what have taken years to deteriorate. 
Soffits were in a deteriorated nature, and some of the facia 
and sore of the other wood members around the facia and soffit 
areas. There were some holes in the exterior of the window 
panels where the inside heated air was just blowing out through 
these holes and was not maintained. It appeared to have been 
there for some time. General observation was that things were 
not being maintained that had been there for some time. 
Q Okay. Were there any safety or health hazards that 
you observed from your examination with the exterior of the 
building? 
KR. CARLSTON: In addition to the ones hefs already 
rentioned? 
Q (BY MR. KING) Well, I want -- I have a question 
about what you've mentioned, but I can come back to that. You 
mentioned before that the concrete was in a deteriorated state 
and that it may have been unsafe; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. In addition to that are there any things that 
ycu observed that would constitute a health or safety problem? 
A Yes. Cn the exterior of the building I observed 
2 5 
electrical, at least one electrical cutlet that was in an 
unrepaired state and appeared to have been that way for scrr.e 
time. Bare wires hanging there. There was no cover plate. I 
did not -- well, it appeared to be in a very unsafe condition 
where somebody could get possibly electrocuted. There were 
other areas on the back of the building that had a lot of junk, 
debris, that could pose not only health but safety problems for 
the general public, and especially children. Seme concrete 
possibility as far as like sidewalks being in an unlevel 
condition, possible tripping on the sidewalks, et cetera. 
Q Any ether things you observed that could constitute a 
health or safety problem in your mind? 
A None that I can think of at this time. 
Q Ycu talked earlier about the concrete being in a 
deteriorated nature, being unsafe. What did you have in mind, 
how that would be unsafe? 
A As I recall just unlevelness and there was some 
concrete that needed repair next to the building that was not 
repaired and has some potential there. 
Q So when you say unlevel concrete you are referring 
specifically to the sidewalks? 
A Yes. 
Q Is there anything else? 
A Nothing that I can think of. 
Q What ordinances or cedes are in effect that regulate 
*"N r 
Z D 
1 the kind of things that you observed on the exterior of the 
2 building? 
3 J A The Uniform Building Code I am sure has something in 
there regarding the overall maintenance of building. Again I 
5 I would have to reserve judgment on that area. But certainly in 
6 the area of the health department looking at areas that may be 
7 I unsafe on the exterior of the building and its general 
condition and safety and welfare of the public. 
9 I Q Did you have a chance or did you observe that there 
10 were any weeds at the property? 
11 A Yes, there were in a number of areas around the site. 
12 Q Where specifically did you notice weeds? 
13 I A West side, south side were the main areas. The 
others I don't recall seeing any. 
Q Okay. Were these weeds dead standing weeds or were 
16 I they -- I wouldn't assume they were growing, were they? 
17 J A Not at this time of the year. If you consider them 
ilive yes, some of them such as trees that have volunteered 
19 | themselves, junk trees were even growing in different places 
20 I that should have been taken out. Other debris around the site, 
anywhere from dirt to concrete chunks, you name it, it was 
2 2 I probably there. 
23 J Q You referred earlier to an electrical outlet that was 
open and that there were bare wires hanging out. Where did ycu 
:-rve that; what part of the building? <j±- :=> c 
11 
A On the west side. 
Q On the back of the building? 
A Uh-huh. (Affirmative) 
Q Was it toward the north or the south end of the 
building? 
A About in the middle. There were ether things on the 
outside of the building that -- there were tile missing in 
between the brick areas that had fallen off and never been 
replaced. There was other holes in those same areas that air 
and water, et cetera, were able to get through in some of those 
areas in different parts of the building. 
Q Okay. Are there any other things that you observed 
from your physical inspection of the exterior of the buildings 
or parking lot area -- we talked about the weeds and the debris 
and some of the other things on the exterior of the buildings. 
Are there any other things you observed specifically? 
MR. CARLSTON: You are not trying to recapsule his 
testimony, are you? ••'•• 
MR. KING: No. I just want to tell you what I donft 
want to hear again. 
A Thatfs all that I recall at this time. 
MR. KING: I donft have any other questions. 
MR. CARLSTON: Thank you. I have no questions. 
(Whereupon, the deposition concluded at 12:00 p.m.) 
Original deposition delivered to Mr. Carlston. 
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